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UNAPPEALING: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE LIMITS ON
APPEAL RIGHTS IN CANADA'S NEW REFUGEE
DETERMINATION SYSTEM
ANGUS GRANT & SEAN REHAAG'
I. INTRODUCTION
Refugee adjudication is hard.
It is hard because adjudicators must decide how likely it is that
claimants may be persecuted in foreign countries due to their race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.' Not only does this involve predictions about what may happen
in the future,2 but it also involves factual findings about conditions in
unfamiliar places, where information may be scant and unreliable.3
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1 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27, s 96 [IRPA].
2 Refugee protection is forward looking, which is to say the question is not whether
claimants faced persecution in the past but whether they would face persecution in
the future. See Canada, Immigration and Refugee Board, "Interpretation of the
Convention Refugee Definition in the Case Law" (31 December 2010), online:
<www.irb-cisr.gc.ca>.
See France Houle, "The Credibility and Authoritativeness of Documentary
Information in Determining Refugee Status: The Canadian Experience" (1994) 6:1
Intl J Refugee L 6; Susan K Kerns, "Country Conditions Documentation in US
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It is also hard because much of the evidence is testimony given by
claimants, who have a strong interest in the outcomes of their claims.
Credibility is often a determining factor, but the refugee law context
makes credibility difficult to assess consistently.5 In refugee hearings,
cross-cultural communication failures are common, 6 and are
compounded by challenges posed by hearing testimony through
interpreters, sometimes of poor quality.7 Moreover, claimants, who are
often under great stress, may be suffering from post-traumatic stress
disorder or other conditions that affect their ability to testify
persuasively., Refugee claimants may also lack meaningful assistance in
preparing their claims and in putting together their evidence because
some are not represented by counsel. For those who do secure counsel,
quality varies dramatically.,
Asylum Cases: Leveling the Evidentiary Playing Field" (2000) 8:1 Ind J Global Leg
Stud 197; Arwen Swink, "Queer Refuge: A Review of the Role of Country
Condition Analysis in Asylum Adjudications for Members of Sexual Minorities"
(2005) 29:2 Hastings Intl & Comp L Rev 251.
Martin Jones & Sasha Baglay, Refugee Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2007) at 241.
C6cile Rousseau et al, "The Complexity of Determining Refugeehood: A
Multidisciplinary Analysis of the Decision-making Process of the Canadian
Immigration and Refugee Board" (2002) 15:1 J Refugee Studies 43.
6 Ibid at 62-64.
Robert F Barsky, "The Interpreter and the Canadian Convention Refugee Hearing:
Crossing the Potentially Life-Threatening Boundaries between 'coccode-e-eh, cluck-
cluck' and 'cot-cot-cot"' (1993) 6:2 TTR: Traduction, Terminologie, R6daction 131
at 141-46; Adrian Humphreys, "Translator Error Sinks Woman's Refugee Hearing"
NationalPost (18 July 2011), online: <www.nationalpost.com>.
Hilary Evans Cameron, "Refugee Status Determinations and the Limits of Memory"
(2010) 22:4 IntlJ Refugee L 469 at 504.
See Sean Rehaag, "The Role of Counsel in Canads Refugee Determination System:
An Empirical Assessment" (2011) 49:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 71 at 92-93; Sean Rehaag,
Julianna Beaudoin & Jennifer Danch, "No Refuge: Hungarian Romani Refugee
Claimants in Canada" (forthcoming) Osgoode Hall LJ, online:
<ssrn.com/abstract=2588058>; Sule Tomkinson, "The Impact of Procedural
Capital and Quality Counsel in the Canadian Refugee Determination Process"
(2014) 1:3 IntlJ Migration & Border Studies 276.
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Refugee adjudication is hard, also, because of the decision-making
process itself. Refugee hearings are brief."' Decision makers have
heavy case loads, " and they are encouraged to decide cases
quickly-immediately after the hearing, if possible.12
Moreover, refugee adjudication is hard because there are systemic
challenges in terms of consistency." Some adjudicators adopt skeptical
attitudes towards refugee claimants and view their role as largely about
protecting the integrity of Canada's immigration system. Others are
more generous and understand their roles to be primarily about giving
effect to human rights." This leads to large adjudicator-by-adjudicator
variations in recognition rates.15 As a result, refugee adjudicators cannot
easily identify consensus positions on whether a particular claim-or
even a particular type of claim-is well founded.,'
In addition to being hard, refugee adjudication involves high stakes.
False negatives may result in refugees being deported to countries where
they face persecution, torture, or even death.1 Such a result would put
1o Hearings typically last half a day. See Immigration and Refugee Board,
"Claimant's Guide" (2013), online: <www.irb-cisr.gc.ca/Eng/RefClaDem/Pages/
ClaDemGuide.aspx>.
" For statistics on refugee adjudication, including the number of cases heard by each
adjudicator, see Sean Rehaag, "2013 Refugee Claim Data and IRB Member
Recognition Rates", Canadian Council for Refugees (14 April 2014), online:
<ccrweb.ca/en/2013-refugee-claim-data> [Rehaag, "2013 Statistics"].
12 See Refugee Protection Division Rules, SOR/2012-256, r 10(8).
13 Sean Rehaag, "Troubling Patterns in Canadian Refugee Adjudication" (2008) 39:2
Ottawa L Rev 335 at 352 [Rehaag, "Troubling"].
" Rousseau et al, supra note 5 at 66.
I5 Rehaag, "Troubling", supra note 13 at 89; Rehaag, "2013 Statistics", supra note 11.
16 Audrey Macklin, "Truth and Consequences: Credibility Determination in the
Refugee Context" in The Realities of Refugee Determination on the Eve of a New
Millennium: The Role of the Judiciary (Haarlem, Netherlands: International
Association of Refugee LawJudges, 1999) 134 at 139.
1 A refugee, by definition, faces such risks. See IRPA, supra note 1, ss 96-97.
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Canada in breach of international law." False positives also have serious
consequences, because they may undermine the integrity of Canada's
immigration system and encourage future unfounded claims, thereby
eroding public confidence in the refugee determination system.
Because refugee adjudication is hard, mistakes are inevitable. Because
the stakes are so high in a decision-making process where mistakes will
occur, advocates for refugees, human rights organizations, international
organizations, scholars, and parliamentarians have long called for a
robust appeal mechanism in Canada's refugee determination process. 20
Partly in response to these calls, when Canada's refugee
determination system was revised in 2012,21 the new process included a
quasi-judicial administrative appeal on matters of both fact and law at
the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) of the Immigration and Refugee
Board (IRB).22 Under the new process, however, many claimants are
denied access to the RAD. 23
This article assesses these limits on access to the RAD, drawing
mostly on quantitative data obtained from the IRB and Citizenship and
Immigration Canada (CIC) through access to information requests. Our
aim is to provide evidence-based analysis and recommendations for
1s Under international law, Canada is generally obliged to refrain from returning
refugees to countries where they face persecution, and a person is a refugee when
they factually meet the refugee definition, irrespective of whether they have been
recognized as such through formal legal procedures. James C Hathaway & Michelle
Foster, The Law of Refugee Status, 2nd ed (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press, 2014) at 1.
19 Stephen Gallagher, "Canada's Dysfunctional Refugee Determination System:
Canadian Asylum Policy from a Comparative Perspective" (2003) 78 Public Policy
Sources at 20, online: Fraser Institute <www.fraserinstitute.org>.
20 See the text accompanying notes 24-50.
21 Balanced Refugee Reform Act, SC 2010, c 8 [BRRA]; Protecting Canada'
Immigration System Act, SC 2012, c 17 [PCISA]. See also Lorne Waldman &
Jacqueline Swaisland, Canada' Refugee Determination Procedure: A Guide for the
Post Bill C-31 Era (Markham, Ont: LexisNexis Canada, 2013).
22 IRPA, supra note 1, ss 110-11.
23 See the text accompanying notes 101-106.
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reform. Essentially, our conclusions are that the bars on access to the
RAD are arbitrary and dangerous, and that the system should be
reformed to provide access to the RAD for all refugee claimants.
The article proceeds in two parts. First, we set out the context for our
research, explaining why access to the RAD matters. Specifically, we
discuss the history of the RAD, explain how the process works, explore
the difference between the appeal and judicial review, and provide an
overview of the results from the revised system's first two years of
operation. Next, we examine in detail each of the bars on access to the
RAD for claimants whose applications were refused at first instance. The
article ends by setting out our conclusions.
II. CONTEXT: THE REFUGEE APPEAL DIVISION AND THE
REVISED REFUGEE DETERMINATION SYSTEM
A. HISTORYOF THE RAD
In the mid-1980s, Ed Ratushny and Gunther Plaut were separately
commissioned to provide reports on the state of Canada's refugee
determination system and the direction it should take. Their reports
called for an overhaul of the system such that it would include an initial
oral hearing into the merits of refugee claims and a robust appeal
process.2 4 The recommendation for an appeal was, at least in part, a
response to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR), which had suggested that a full merit-based appeal process
was a "basic requirement" of a fair refugee determination system.2 5
24 See Ed Ratushny, A New Refugee Status Determination Process for Canada: Report to
the Minister ofEmployment and Immigration (Ottawa: Department of Employment
and Immigration, 1984); Gunther Plaut, Refugee Determination in Canada:A Report
to the Honourable Flora MacDonald, Minister of Employment and Immigration
(Ottawa: Supply & Services Canada, 1985). See also Mary C Hurley, "Principles,
Practices, Fragile Promises: Judicial Review of Refugee Determination Decisions
Before the Federal Court of Canada" (1996) 41:2 McGill LJ 317 at 380.
25 See Handbook and Guidelines on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee
Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of
207
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While critics argued that the government of the day appeared intent
on ignoring the reports, 6 the government could not ignore the Supreme
Court of Canada, which, in its 1985 decision in Singh v Minister of
Employment and Immigration," found that oral hearings into refugee
claims, at least where credibility is at issue, are required by both the
Canadian Bill of Rights28 and the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms.9 The IRB was established in 1989 in response to the Singh
decision. Yet, while the new IRB provided for first-level oral hearings
into refugee claims, it did not include an appeal process for refugee
determinations. Instead, a claimant's recourse following a negative
refugee determination was initially limited to an appeal to the Federal
Court of Appeal,"' and then, after a subsequent round of legislative
changes, to a highly circumscribed judicial review process before the
Federal Court1-processes that, according to empirical scholarship,
resulted in arbitrary limits on access to mechanisms to correct errors in
refugee determinations.32
Refugees (December 2011) HCR/1P/4/ENG/REV 3 at para 192, citing Official
Records of the General Assembly, 32nd Sess, Supp No 12 (A/32/12/Add.1),
para 53(6)(e).
26 See e.g. "They Ask for Asylum", The Globe and Mail (4 June 1984) A6.
27 [1985] 1 SCR 177, 17 DLR (4th) 422 [Singh].
28 SC 1960, c 44.
29 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982 being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK),
c 11 [Charter].
3o See Immigration Act, RSC 1985, c 1-2, s 83.3, as amended by SC 1988, c 35, s 19
[repealed].
3 See ibid, s 82.1, as amended by SC 1992, c 49, s 73 [repealed].
32 See Ian Greene & Paul Shaffer, "Leave to Appeal and Leave to Commence Judicial
Review in Canada's Refugee-Determination System: Is the Process Fair?" (1992) 4:1
Intl J Refugee L 71; Ian Greene et al, Final Appeal: Decision-Making in Canadian
Courts ofAppeal (Toronto: James Lorimer & Company, 1998) at 19-21.
VOL 49:1208
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Throughout the 1990s, rights groups pressured the government to
create an administrative appeal." International organizations also took
notice. For example, the UNHCR indicated that Canada should "afford
a clear opportunity for the review of decisions on their merits in the
post-claim review process."14 Similarly, in 2000, the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights criticized the lack of a merit-based
appeal in Canada's refugee determination system:
Where the facts of an individual's situation are in dispute, the effective
procedural framework should provide for their review. Given that even
the best decision-makers may err in passing judgment, and given the
potential risk to life which may result from such an error, an appeal on
the merits of a negative determination constitutes a necessary element of
international protection.
In 2001, Parliament passed the Immigration and Refugee Protection
Act. 6 It provided, at least notionally, a response to these critiques. 7 The
IRPA restructured the IRB, eliminating dual-member panels that had
previously conducted first-instance refugee hearings at the (newly
renamed) Refugee Protection Division (RPD). 38 The shift to
one-member refugee determination hearings was controversial because,
under the previous regime, any disagreement on the overall merits of a
" See Karlene Nation, "Planned Refugee Rules Attacked", Toronto Star (30 August
1992) A10; Lila Sarick, "Refugee Board to Assign Single-Person Panels", The Globe
and Mail (3 March 1995) A4.
House of Commons, Legislative Committee on Bill C-86, 34th Parl, 3rd Sess (11
August 1992) (Dessalegn Chefeke, Representative in Canada of the UNHCR).
3 "Report on the Situation of Human Rights of Asylum Seekers within the
Canadian Refugee Determination System" (28 February 2000), Inter-Am
Comm HR, OEA/Ser.L/V/JI.106 doc 40 rev at para 109, online:
<https://www.cidh.oas.org/countryrep/Canada2000en/table-of-contents.htm>.
3 IRPA, supra note 1.
For a general discussion of these reforms, see Catherine Dauvergne, "Evaluating
Canada's New Immigration and Refugee Protection Act in Its Global Context" (2003)
41:3 Alta L Rev 725 at 733.
See ibid at 728-29.
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refugee claim was settled in favour of the claimant and, as such,
dual-member panels were viewed as an important safety valve. At the
same time, the costs associated with two-member panels, together with
the allure of being able to virtually double the number of hearings
conducted, were sufficient to carry the day.40 To compensate for the
elimination of two-member panels, the government created (at least on
paper) a new appeal division of the IRB: the RAD.1 However, in a move
that refugee rights groups have long felt amounted to a bait and switch,42
the government of the day refused to implement that which it appeared
to have legislated into existence.4
When then-Immigration Minister Denis Coderre first announced
that the RAD would not be implemented immediately, the decision was
characterized as a "delay" for up to a year due to "pressures on the
system. " The year, however, passed without implementation.
Governments since that time appeared content with an appeal process
that had been duly legislated by Parliament, but left to wither
unimplemented on the desks of successive immigration ministers.
Not surprisingly, refugee rights groups were extremely disappointed
with the elimination of the procedural safeguard of two-member panels
' See ibid; Audrey Macklin, "Refugee Roulette in the Canadian Casino" in Jaya
Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I Schoenholtz & Philip G Schrag, eds, Refugee Roulette:
Disparities in Asylum Adjudication and Proposals Jr Reform (New York: NYU Press,
2009) 135 at 146-47; Peter Showler, "Submission to the Standing Committee on
Citizenship and Immigration" (29 March 2007), online: Canadian Council for
Refugees <ccrweb.ca/sites/ccrweb.ca/files/static-files/documents/showlero7.pdf>.
40 See IRPA, supra note 1, s 163.
41 Bill C-11, Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, 1st Sess, 37th Parl, 2001,
c1110-111, 171 (as passed by the House of Commons 13June 2001).
42 See Campbell Clark, "Coderre to Delay Plan for Refugee Appeal Division', The
Globe and Mail (29 April 2002) A6.
3 Order Fixing June 28, 2002 as the Date of the Coming into Force of Certain Provisions
of theAct, S1/2002-97, (2002) C Gaz II, 1637 (IRPA).
" Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Press Release, "Refugee Appeal Division
Implementation Delayed" (29 April 2002).
VOL 49:1210
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and the corresponding failure to implement an appeal. 5 Once again, the
international community took notice, with the UNHCR calling on
Canada to implement the appeal, which it called "a fundamental,
necessary part of any refugee status determination process." 6 Even the
Parliamentary Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, typically
dominated by the government of the day, was frustrated with the failure
to implement the RAD and unanimously called on the Minister to either
implement it or advise the Committee of an alternative proposal. -
There were a number of responses to the government's somewhat
bizarre course of (in)action on refugee appeals. Advocacy campaigns
were mounted to pressure the government into implementing the RAD
and, in 2006, a private Member's bill was introduced to compel its
implementation.8 The bill appeared to have considerable support, but it
died on the Order Paper with Parliament's proroguing in 2007. The bill
was reintroduced during the next session, and while it was approved by
both the House of Commons and the Senate, it too died on the Order
Paper with the call of the 2008 election. After the election, the bill was
once again introduced, but, in 2009, it was defeated at third reading by a
single vote cast by the Speaker of the House."
See e.g. Canadian Council for Refugees, "The Refugee Appeal: Is No
One Listening?" (31 March 2005), online: <ccrweb.ca/sites/ccrweb.ca/files/
static-files/refugeeappeal.pdf>; Amnesty International, "Canada: Amnesty
International Submission to the UN Universal Periodic Review: Fourth Session of
the UPR Working Group of the Human Rights Council, February 2009" (8
September 2008) at 5.
46 Letter from UNHCR Representative in Canada Judith Kumin to Citizenship and
Immigration Minister Denis Coderre (9 May 2002), online: Canadian Council for
Refugees <ccrweb.ca/sites/ccrweb.ca/files/static-f8les/unhcrRAD.html>.
4- House of Commons, Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, 38th
Parl, 1st Sess, No 16 (14 December 2004) at 1815 (motion).
8 Bill C-280, An Act to Amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (coming into
force ofsections 110, 111 and 171), 39th Parl, 1st Sess, 2006.
49 Bill C-280, An Act to Amend the Immigation and Refugee Protection Act (coming into
force ofsections 110, 111 and 171), 39th Parl, 2nd Sess, 2007.
5o Bill C-291, An Act toAmend the Immigation and Refugee Protection Act (coming into
force ofsections 110, 111 and 171), 40th Parl, 2nd Sess, 2009.
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"The law hath not been dead, though it hath slept.", Those are
Shakespeare's words, but they could equally have described the situation
of the RAD when, in 2010, the minority Conservative government
introduced a wide-ranging set of reforms to Canada's refugee
determination system that included the implementation of the appeal.52
A further round of legislation 1 (passed after the Conservative
government obtained a majority in Parliament) maintained the RAD's
implementation, but prevented certain classes of refugee claimants from
accessing it. 4
As a result, on 15 December 2012, over a decade after its notional
legislative creation, the RAD was formally launched-though with
restrictions that were not initially contemplated.
B. RAD IN THE NEW SYSTEM
The basic structure of the RAD is more or less the same as was first
contemplated. It is a division of the IRB,5 presided over by Governor in
Council appointees,56 who determine appeals of RPD decisions on
matters of both law and fact.5 As was originally intended, the RAD is
meant to serve as a full appeal on the merits. Speaking in the House of
Commons, former Minister of Citizenship and Immigration Jason
Kenney remarked:
[T]he bill would ... create the new refugee appeal division. The vast
majority of claimants . .. would for the first time, if rejected at the
refugee protection division, have access to a full fact-based appeal at the
51 William Shakespeare, NW Bawcutt, ed, The Oxford Shakespeare: Measure for
Measure (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991) at 126.
52 BRRA, supra note 21.
5 PCISA, supra note 21.
51 See the text accompanying notes 10 1-106.
5 IRPA, supra note 1, s 151.
56 Ibid, s 153(1) (a).
51 Ibid, s 110 (1).
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refugee appeal division of the IRB. This is the first government to have
created a full fact-based appeal.
While the RAD is meant to offer a "full fact-based appeal", it is also
meant to be part of a dramatically expedited refugee determination
system. The broad aims of the government's recent refugee reforms have
been to quicken the pace of determination and to rapidly remove
unsuccessful refugee claimants.5" Thus, for example, first-instance refugee
hearings before the RPD are now supposed to be conducted within
30-60 days," whereas, under the former regime, a refugee claim could
take several years to schedule.I Similarly speedy timelines apply to the
RAD. Appellants-who could be either the Minister or eligible
claimants-must file a Notice of Appeal within 15 days of receiving the
written reasons of the RPD's decision.6' Then, within 30 days of
receiving the decision, appellants must perfect their appeals, including in
their written materials any portions of the RPD transcript they intend to
rely upon, any evidence that the RPD refused to consider, any eligible
new evidence that the RAD should consider, and a memorandum of
argument outlining the errors that the RPD is alleged to have made.6
The appeal process has not only strict time limits, but also
limitations on the evidence that will be considered. Appellants and
respondents may rely on any evidence that was submitted to the RPD.
5 House of Commons Debates, 41st Parl, 1st Sess, No 90 (6 March 2012) at 5784
(Jason Kenney).
5 For a discussion of the broad aims of the reforms, see address delivered by Jason
Kenney (16 February 2012) at a news conference in Ottawa following the tabling of
Bill C-31, Protecting Canada' Immigration System Act, online:
<www.cic.gc.ca/english/department/media/speeches/2012/2012-02-1 6 .asp>.
60 Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227, s 159.9
[IRPA Regs].
61 For example, in FY2011-12, the average processing time for RPD cases was 20
months. See Immigration and Refugee Board, 2011-12 Departmental Performance
Report Part III(2012).
6 IRPA Regs, supra note 60, s 159.91(1) (a).
61 Ibid, s 159.91(1)(b); RefugeeAppeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257, rr 2-3.
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There are, however, severe restrictions on the submission of new
evidence by refugee claimants appealing negative RPD decisions. Such
appellants may only present evidence that "arose after the rejection of
their claim or that was not reasonably available, or that the person could
not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have
presented, at the time of the rejection."" Interestingly, the Minister is not
subject to similar restrictions.65
The evidence and arguments submitted will typically be considered
in a paper-based process, though oral hearings can be held where
the evidence raises a potentially determinative credibility issue that is
central to the claim." Upon hearing an appeal-either on paper or in
person-the RAD generally has three dispositions available: it may
confirm the RPD's decision, it may set aside the RPD decision and
substitute its own determination on the merits, or it may refer a matter
back to the RPD and order a new hearing, providing whatever directions
it considers appropriate.17
While RAD applications or decisions are pending, refugee claimants
benefit from automatic stays on removal.68 They also typically benefit
from automatic stays pending judicial review of RAD decisions.t9 This
means that claimants with access to the RAD will generally not be
deported while the oversight process runs its course.
C. RAD AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
Despite the RAD's implementation, judicial review before the Federal
Court continues to play an important role in Canadas refugee
determination system. For refugee claimants with access to the RAD,
6 IRPA, supra note 1, s 110(4).
65 Ibid.
66See IRPA, supra note 1, s 110(6). See also the text accompanying note79.
6 See IRPf, supra note 1, s 111(1).
Ibid, s 4 9(2)(c). Technically, this provision delays the coming into force of removal
orders rather than staying removal orders, but the effect is the same as a stay.
69 IRPA Regs, supra note 6 0, s 231. For exceptions, see ibid, ss 231(2)-(4).
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judicial review provides an opportunity to challenge RAD decisions.70
For those barred from the RAD, judicial review is the only recourse
against unlawful RPD decisions and, potentially, unlawful removal.'
Nonetheless, judicial review and appeals to the RAD should not be
mistaken as equivalent.
The most obvious difference between judicial review and the RAD
appeal process is that they are conceptually species of an entirely
different order. Judicial review of decisions made by delegated authorities
is first and foremost a mechanism designed to supervise the relationship
between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government.
To be sure, judicial review implicates the interests of various parties, but
more fundamentally it is meant to maintain a division of powers that
respects legislative choices while preserving the role of the judiciary in
ensuring the legality of executive action. It is for this reason that judicial
review generally extends deference to administrative decisions: if its
raison d'etre is primarily one of democratic place-keeping, its role in
reviewing administrative decisions is a limited one, confined to ensuring
that legislative intent is not exceeded and the rule of law is respected.
This is further reflected in the statutory limits on remedies available in
Federal Court judicial review, and on the grounds upon which those
remedies can be granted.72 This also explains the bifurcated standards of
review in the current jurisprudence on judicial review of administrative
decision making. According to this jurisprudence, courts should apply a
standard of correctness (i.e., decide the matter on a de novo basis without
showing any deference to the administrative decision maker) when
deciding constitutional or jurisdictional issues, matters related to
procedural fairness, or general legal questions of central importance to
-0 Refugee claimants who are eligible to access the RAD must exhaust all recourses at
the RAD prior to applying for judicial review. See IRP, supra note 1, s 72.
n Refugee claimants barred from access to the RAD can apply for judicial review
of RPD decisions. See ibid. Other mechanisms to assess risks prior to
removal are, under the new system, no longer available to most refugee claimants. See
e.g. ibid, s 112.
72 See Federal CourtsAct, RSC 1985, c F-7, s 18-18.1 [FCAct].
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the legal system that are not within the administrative decision maker's
specialized expertise.-' In most other areas, including factual findings and
legal determinations within the administrative decision maker's
specialized expertise, a more deferential standard of reasonableness
applies. Where the reasonableness standard applies, the court will not
overturn an administrative decision if it falls within a range of reasonable
possible outcomes-even if the court would have decided the case
differently had it approached the matter on a de novo basis.74
Administrative appeal bodies, however, are created under an entirely
different set of operating principles. They play no role in the equilibrium
of the constitutional order and their powers are more constrained. They
are not intended to govern the relationship between the judiciary and
specialized tribunals, but exist, rather, to enhance the quality of decision
making emanating from first-instance administrative matters.
Paying attention to the conceptual differences between internal
administrative appeals and judicial review is important, because failing to
do so renders the former redundant: if appeals amount to little more
than a deferential review for compliance with legislative intent and the
rule of law, then nothing was gained by the creation of the RAD, aside
from a senseless bifurcation of review streams. As the Federal Court
- See Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v Alberta Teachers'Association,
2011 SCC 61 at para 30, [2011] 3 SCR 654; Canada (Canadian Human Rights
Commission) v Canada (Attorney General), 2011 SCC 53 at para 18, [2011] 3 SCR
471. It should be noted, however, that in some recent Federal Court of Appeal
jurisprudence, the Court has suggested that deference may be warranted on
questions related to a tribunal's choice of procedures. See e.g. Re:Sound v Fitness
Industry Council of Canada, 2014 FCA 48 at paras 34-42, [2015] 2 FCR 170;
Maritime Broadcasting System Ltd v Canadian Media Guild, 2014 FCA 59 at paras
50-56, 373 DLR (4th) 167; Forest Ethics Advocacy Association et al v National
Energy Board et al, 2014 FCA 245 at paras 70-73, 465 NR 152. That said, the
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Canada remains clear that the standard for
determining whether a decision maker has complied with the duty of procedural
fairness continues to be correctness. See Mission Institution v Khela, 2014 SCC 24 at
para 79, [2014] 1 SCR 502.
7 Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 at paras 43-64, [2008] 1 SCR 190.
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noted in a recent case on the RAD's appellate role, the creation of an
appellate tribunal is, in itself, an indication that "Parliament sought to
achieve something other than that available under judicial review."75
There are also procedural differences between the RAD and judicial
review that are perhaps born out of the conceptual differences. The first
and most obvious difference between the two is that those seeking
judicial review must first obtain leave from the Federal Court.76 There is
no direct right of judicial review, and, in determining leave applications,
reasons are not required and are seldom provided.77 The RAD must, in
contrast, render substantive decisions with reasons on all appeals
properly brought before it.-
Another difference is that, while the RAD is mostly a paper-based
process, oral hearings may be conducted where there is evidence that
raises a serious issue with respect to the refugee claimant's credibility and
7 Huruglica v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigation), 2014 FC 799 at para
41, [2014] 4 FCR 811 [Huruglica]. It should be noted that there has been some
disagreement at the Federal Court about the proper understanding of the RAD's
relationship to the RPD-and, by implication, the distinction between the RAD
and judicial review. For a discussion of this matter, see infra notes 99-100 and
accompanying text. It is also worth noting that administrative appeal mechanisms in
several jurisdictions are also determined, to varying extents, on the merits, as in the
decisions of the New Zealand Immigration and Protection Tribunal (see generally
New Zealand, Ministry of Justice, "Immigration and Protection Tribunal: Practice
Note 2/2015 (Refugee and Protection)" (8 June 2015), online: Ministry of Justice
<www.justice.govt.nz>); the United States Board of Immigration Appeals on
questions of law, discretion, and judgment (see generally Matter of A-S-B-, 24 I&N
Dec 493 (BIA 2008)); and the UK Immigration and Asylum Chamber (see generally
Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules
2014; Gina Clayton, Immigration and Asylum Law (London, UK: Oxford
University Press, 2012) at 255).
76 See IRPA, supra note 1, s 72.
n For an empirical analysis of how the process works in the refugee law context, see
Sean Rehaag, "Judicial Review of Refugee Determinations: The Luck of the Draw"
(2012) 38:1 Queens LJ 1 [Rehaag, "Luck of the Draw"].
7 See IRPA, supra note 1, ss 111(1), 169.
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that is determinative of the merits of the claim.79 In contrast, given its
supervisory nature, the Federal Court does not allow for oral testimony
of refugee claimants to assess credibility."
Along similar lines, judicial review is almost always confined to a
consideration of the evidence that was before the first-instance decision
maker." The only real exception to this general rule is where an issue of
procedural fairness has effectively impeded the production of evidence at
the first instance. 2 As we have noted, however, although the RAD has
limited authority to consider new evidence submitted by claimants, such
evidence can be admitted if it was not reasonably available at the time of
the initial hearing-and new evidence by the Minister is not subject to
similar limitations."
The dispositions available on judicial review and at the RAD also
differ. When the Federal Court quashes an improper refugee
determination, its ability to influence the redetermination of the claim
on the merits is limited to providing directions to the RPD in hearing
the matter afresh. And while such directions occasionally all but require
the RPD to accept a claim, Federal Court justices, perhaps sensitive to
the limitations of their role, rarely provide them. In contrast, as noted
above, the RAD has relatively broad remedial powers, ranging from
upholding the RPD decision to substituting its own decision."
7 See ibid, s 110(6).
so Indeed neither the FC Act, supra note 72, nor the corresponding Federal Courts
Immigration and Refugee Protection Rules, SOR/93-22, provides a mechanism for the
taking of oral testimony in the context of its judicial review proceedings. The
overarching rule is that an applicant on judicial review can only rely on evidence that
was before the decision maker. See Ochapowace Indian Band v Canada (AG), 2007
FC 920 at para 9, [2008] 3 FCR 571 [Ochapowace].
sl See ibid at paras 9-12. This rule was recently reaffirmed in Association of Universities
and Colleges of Canada etalv Canadian Copyright LicensingAgency, 2012 FCA 22 at
paras 17-20, 428 NR 297.
82 See Ochapowace, supra note 80 at para 9.
8 See the text accompanying notes 64-65.
84 See FCAct, supra note 72, s 18.1(3)(b).
1 See the text accompanying note 67.
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Another important difference relates to stays on removal. Claimants
eligible to appeal to the RAD generally benefit from automatic stays on
removal pending both RAD decisions and judicial reviews of RAD
decisions." Claimants who are not eligible to access the RAD, however,
are not entitled to automatic stays of removals pending determination of
judicial review applications of RPD decisions.' This may result not only
in removal prior to any oversight of RPD decisions, but also in the
mooting out of remedies available at the Federal Court if removal has
already taken place." The failure to provide automatic stays also has
significant resource implications for the Federal Court, for the
Department of Justice, and perhaps most significantly, for claimants (and
legal aid programs), as claimants who are not eligible to appeal to the
RAD must now go to the Federal Court seeking stays on removal under
common-law principles pending judicial review of their RPD decisions."
In sum, there are several important distinctions between
judicial review and the RAD. These differences indicate that the
availability of judicial review is not a replacement for a full appeal on the
merits at the RAD.
' See IRPA, supra note 1, s 49(2)(c); IRPA Regs, supra note 60, s 231.
8 Automatic stays are limited to those appealing RAD decisions. See IRPA, supra note
1, s 4 9(2)(c); IRP Regs, supra note 60, s 231.
8 This possibility was raised in the context of the new statutory scheme, though not
resolved, in Del Pilar Bravo v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
2014 FC 1099 (CanLII). See also Rosa v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2014 FC 1234, 32 Imm LR (4th) 142.
89 The common-law test for stays of removal is set out in Toth v Canada (Minister




D. OVERVIEW OF FIRST Two YEARS OF NEW SYSTEM RESULTS
As discussed above, Canada's new refugee determination process,
including the RAD, has been in operation since 15 December 2012.90
To find out how the new system is working, we made access to
information requests to the IRB and reviewed early jurisprudence from
the new system.
According to data provided by the IRB,9 during the first two years of
operation in the new system, there were 22,871 first-instance claims
referred and 17,082 claims finalized. Of the finalized cases, 10,030 were
accepted; 5,865 were rejected; and 1,187 were abandoned, withdrawn,
or otherwise resolved. As can be seen in Table 1, the 63.1% recognition
rate 9 2 under the new system significantly exceeds recent historical
averages and reverses a trend of declining recognition rates. While some
of the increase is likely due to changes in the countries of origin of
claimants,93 even within particular countries one sees an increase in
recognition rates. For example, as indicated in Table 2, the recognition
rates increased under the new system in 7 of the top 10 countries in
terms of number of claims finalized. Thus, it would seem that, for the
first two years of its operation, the new system was on average more
accepting of refugee claims decided on the merits than the old system.
Notwithstanding the increase in recognition rates, there are
some troubling patterns in first-instance decisions under the new
" See text accompanying notes 52-53.
9' ATIP A-2013-00193 (23 May 2013), ATIP A-2013-02091 (9 April 2014) & ATIP
A-2014-04296 (20 February 2015) [IRB Country Reports]. These requests were for
IRB Country Reports from 2001 to 2014, which are documents setting out yearly
statistics on outcomes in all claims (including principal applicants and dependants),
broken down by country. For 2013 and 2014, the statistics distinguish between new
system cases and legacy cases.
92 Throughout this article, the term "recognition rate" refers to the percentage of
claims granted relative to claims decided on the merits (i.e., excluding claims
abandoned, withdrawn, or otherwise resolved).
9 See Part III.C.6, below.
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system. According to data provided by the IRB," consistency in
adjudication across decision makers is a problem. As can be seen in
Table 3, under the new system, some decision makers granted refugee
claims in most of the cases they heard, while others denied most cases.
Although some recognition rate variation is to be expected due to
different countries from which decision makers hear claims, variations
persist even when one compares the recognition rates of particular
decision makers against recognition rates that would be predicted based
on weighted country of origin averages for the set of cases decided.
Similarly, as Table 4 shows, there are significant differences in
recognition rates across decision makers even when one looks only at
cases decided from a single country.9"
Regarding the RAD, as can be seen in Table 5, there were 1,871
principal applicant RAD appeals finalized in 2013 and 2014. Of
these, 1,812 (96.8%) were appeals by refugee claimants of negative
first-instance refugee determinations, and only 59 (3.2%) were appeals
by the government of positive first-instance refugee determinations. In
other words, the new appeal is used almost exclusively by claimants
rather than by the government.
Table 5 also lists outcomes for the 1,871 finalized RAD appeals.
Many of these appeals were dismissed on procedural grounds (534 cases,
28.5%). Of the 1,337 cases decided on the merits, when the government
brought the appeal, the success rate was 75.6%, and when the claimant
brought the appeal, the success rate was 26.4%. This last figure is
especially notable because the comparable success rate in perfected
9 ATIP A-2013-01523 (4 April 2014) & ATIP A-2014-04109 (25 February 2015)
[IRB RPD/RAD Data]. Electronic data was requested from the IRB's database
regarding each RPD and RAD decision from 2003 to 2014, including the date,
outcome, file number, country of origin, name of decision maker, etc. Note that this
data covers only principal applicants (i.e., one claim per family, regardless of the
number of family members). The data distinguishes between new system and old
system decisions.
1 For further discussion of variations in recognition rates in a prior year, including an




Federal Court applications for judicial review of negative first-instance
refugee decisions under the prior refugee determination system was
7.8%.96 In other words, in a context where recognition rates at first
instance are significantly above recent historical averages, success rates in
appeals of negative first-instance refugee determinations decided on the
merits at the RAD are more than three times as high as success rates at
the Federal Court for similar applicants under the old system.
As with the RPD, however, there are reasons to be concerned about
consistency in decision making at the RAD. As can be seen in Table 6, in
principal-applicant RAD appeals brought by refugee claimants and
decided on the merits in 2013 and 2014, some decision makers
frequently granted appeals, whereas others did so far less often. Concerns
have also been raised about some of the RAD appointees having
previously been outliers in terms of decision making at the RPD,97
including one decision maker, Daniel McSweeney, who had extremely
low recognition rates at the RPD for several years (2013: 0% of 14 cases;
2012: 1.3% of 80 cases; 2011: 0% of 129 cases).9
In addition to troubling inconsistencies in success rates, there are also
concerns about how adjudicators view their roles in terms of the level of
deference they show to first-instance decision makers. Many early RAD
decisions adopted-wrongly, in our view-the position that RPD
decisions are to be reviewed using the same deferential standard of
review analysis used by courts vis-4-vis administrative decisions.99 These
RAD decision makers defined their function as being confined to
reviewing the reasonableness of RPD decisions, with little regard for
their own assessment of the merits of the case. While, at the time of
96 This is the average success rate in perfected Federal Court applications for judicial
review brought by unsuccessful refugee claimants from 2005 to 2010. See Rehaag,
"Luck of the Draw", supra note 77 at 51.
97 See Louise Elliott, "Decisions by Refugee Appeal Division Members Vary Widely',
CBCNews (14 December 2014), online: <www.cbc.ca>.
9 Yearly data on RPD Member recognition rates from 2006 to 2013 is available online
via links in Rehaag, "2013 Statistics", supra note 11.
See e.g. X (Re), 2013 CanLIl 76473 (CA IRB) at paras 10-29; X (Re), 2013 CanLIl
76405 (CA IRB) at paras 26-49.
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writing, the Federal Court of Appeal has not yet issued a decision on the
appropriate standard of intervention to be used by the RAD, several
Federal Court judges have now found that the RAD's early approach
ignores the conceptual differences between administrative appeals and
judicial review and is, therefore, incorrect.o00
Despite these concerns, in our view, the first two years of operation of
the RAD have been, on balance, promising. In particular, the fact
that the average success rate at the RAD in cases brought by refugee
claimants and decided on the merits far exceeds the equivalent success
rate on judicial review under the old system suggests that the RAD is
catching significant numbers of errors in refugee adjudication-mostly
in claims initially denied by the RPD-that would likely not have been
caught in the Federal Court judicial review process. Thus, access to
the RAD appears to be a key means to correct false negative refugee
determinations and to prevent Canada from deporting refugees to face
persecution, torture, or death. This makes limits on access to the RAD
particularly worrisome.
100 See e.g. Huruglica, supra note 75; Iyamuremye v Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration, 2014 FC 494, [2015] 3 FCR 393; Alyafi v Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration, 2014 FC 952 (CanLII); Spasoja v Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration, 2014 FC 913 (CanLII); Diarra v Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration, 2014 FC 1009, 31 1nm LR (4th) 120; Akuffo v Minister of Citizenship
andImmigration, 2014 FC 1063, 31 Imm LR (4th) 301 [Akuffo]; Ngandu v Minister
of Citizenship and Immigration, 2015 FC 423, 34 Imm LR (4th) 68; Ozdemir v
Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, 2015 FC 621 (CanLII). It should also be
noted that while the Federal Court has now consistently found that the RAD is not
to engage in a reasonableness analysis, there remains disagreement amongst Federal
Court judges as to the standard of review that the Court should employ in reviewing
the RAD's interpretation of its appellate role. Contrast, for example, Huruglica, supra
note 75 at paras 25-34 with Akuffo, supra note 100 at paras 16-26.
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III. THE STUDY: BARS ON ACCESS TO RAD FOR
FIRST-INSTANCE APPEALS ON THE MERITS
A. OVERVIEW OF RAD BARS
As noted earlier, under Canada's new refugee determination system,
some groups of refugee claimants are not eligible to appeal to the RAD.
Specifically, six groups are denied access to the appeal: claimants who
come to Canada via the United States (US) through an exception to the
Canada-US Safe Third Country Agreement (STCA);'O claimants who
come from a designated country of origin (DCO);102 claimants whose
applications for refugee protection have been declared to have no
credible basis (NCB) or to be manifestly unfounded claims (MUC);'Io
claimants who are designated foreign nationals (DFN) due to their
irregular arrival; 'o claimants who abandon or withdraw their
applications;15 and, finally, individuals who were previously recognized
in Canada as refugees but who have had their refugee status taken away
through cessation or vacation processes.106
1'0 The bar on RAD access for claimants who came to Canada via the US through an
exception to the STCA is found at s 110(2)(d) of the IRPA. The SCTA itself is
implemented through an agreement with the United States: see Agreement between
Canada and the United States of America for Cooperation in the Examination of
Refugee Status Claims from Nationals of Third Countries, 5 December 2002 (entered
into force 29 December 2004), online: <www.cic.gc.ca> [STCA Agreement].
Authority to enter into the agreement is provided in the IRPA, supra note 1, s
102(1)(a); IRPA Regs, supra note 60, ss 159.1-159.7. Finally, the exceptions to the
agreement's application are set out in the STCA Agreement itself, at Article 4.
102 IRPA, supra note 1, ss 107(2), 107.1, 109.1, 110(2)(d.1).
103 Ibid, s 110(2)(c).
" Ibid, ss 20.1, 110(2)(a).
15 Ibid, s 110(2)(b).
106 Ibid, ss 108, 109, 110(2)(e), 110(2)(f).
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This article is concerned with the first four groups-that is to say,
claimants denied access to the RAD to appeal negative first-instance
refugee determinations decided on their merits.1
To get a sense of the frequency with which each of these bars on
access to the RAD applies, we made an access to information request to
the IRB.' 8 As can be seen in Table 7, according to the data provided,
most claimants in 2013 who were denied access to the RAD to appeal
first-instance refugee determinations decided on the merits were covered
by an STCA exception (2,253 claims, 23.1% of claims referred). A large
number (468 claims, 8.6% of claims finalized) were denied access
because they came from a DCO. A much smaller number of claimants
were denied access to the RAD due to NCB or MUC declarations (120
claims, 2.2% of claims finalized), while only a handful (43 claims, 0.4%
of claims referred) were barred from the RAD because they were DFNs.
The remainder of this article examines each of these four grounds for
exclusion from the RAD in more detail.
B. SAFE THIRD COUNTRYAGREEMENT
As we have just noted, the largest cohort of individuals denied access to
the RAD are those who were covered by an STCA exception (2,253
claims in 2013). This is a strikingly high number of claims excluded from
what was originally intended to be a comprehensive appeal process. It is
also, in our view, entirely arbitrary.
1. OVERVIEW OF THE STCA
In order to understand how the STCA bar operates, it is important to
first have a sense of the contours of the agreement and its general
implications for refugee claimants. Canadas immigration scheme has
long contemplated barring refugees from protection in Canada if they
" We do not mean to suggest that the other RAD bars are unproblematic. In our view,
all claimants should have access to the RAD. However, the final two groups raise
distinct issues that are better dealt with separately.
108 ATIPA-2013-02030 (14 May 2014) [IRB RAD Bars].
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transited via a safe third country.'9 Canada persuaded the US to enter
into an agreement to facilitate such a bar in exchange for increased
cooperation on border security shortly after the attacks on the World
Trade Center in 2001.no This resulted in the STCA in December
2002."' The STCA is based on the premise that, as both Canada and the
US provide protection for refugees on their territory, refugee claimants
are legitimately limited to asserting a claim for refugee status in their first
country of arrival.- Thus, refugee claimants who enter North America
via the US are required to pursue their claims in the US and will, unless
subject to an exception, be turned back at a Canadian land border
should they attempt to initiate a refugee claim (the inverse is also true).",
In Canada, the STCA has been operationalized through legislation and
regulations that came into effect on 29 December 2004."4
The STCA produced a precipitous drop in refugee claims made in
Canada. In the first full year following the STCA's implementation,
Canada received only 20,786 claims, compared to an average of
35,095 claims per year in the prior 5 years."' While the numbers of
claims rose somewhat in following years,"'6 the STCA's impact on
Canada and the US has always been asymmetrical, as far fewer
'09 An Act to amend the Immigration Act, 1976 and to amend other Acts in consequence
thereof SC 1988, c 35, s 14. See also James C Hathaway, "Postscript-Selective
Concern: An Overview of Refugee Law in Canada" (1989) 34:2 McGill LJ 354
at 355-56.
no See Clark Campbell, "Canada in Talks with U.S. on Pact Dealing with Refugees,
Visitor Visas", The GlobeandMail (26 October 2001) A6; Clark Campbell, "Canada
Reaches Border Deal with U.S.", The GlobeandMail (1 December 2001) Al.
n. STCA, supra note 101
112 Ibid, Preamble.
113 Ibid, art 4.1.
11 IRPA, supra note 1, s 101(1)(e); IRPA Regs, supra note 6 0, s 159.
115 United Nations High Commission for Refugees, Statistical Yearbook 2005: Trends in
Displacement, Protection and Solutions (Geneva: UNHCR, 2007).
116 United Nations High Commission for Refugees, Statistical Online Population
Database, online: <www.unhcr.org>.
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individuals arrive in Canada and continue on to the US to initiate a
refugee claim than the inverse."-
2. EXCEPTIONS TO THE APPLICATION OF THE STCA
There are several exceptions to the STCA that permit refugee claimants
to initiate a claim in Canada after transiting via the US. The first
exception is more accurately described as a limitation on the STCA's
application, namely that the STCA only applies to those seeking entry
into Canada or the US via a land border."' Therefore, an individual who
has come to Canada from the US, but who initiates their refugee claim at
some other port of entry (e.g., airports, ferry terminals), will be
permitted into the country to pursue their claim. Similarly, an individual
who enters Canada without initiating a refugee claim, but does so later at
an inland office, will not be subject to the STCA.
In addition to this general limitation, there are also exceptions to
the STCA that apply to those who seek to enter Canada at land ports
of entry. One such exception is for those who have an adult family
member in Canada."' Also excepted from the STCA's application at land
ports of entry are unaccompanied minors1 2 0 and those who have a
Canadian visitor visa, work or study permit, or other prescribed
document." Another exception applicable at land ports of entry is a
public interest exception, which currently applies to those who have been
See Audrey Macklin, "Disappearing Refugees: Reflections on the Canada-U.S. Safe
Third Country Agreement" (2005) 36:2 Colum HRL Rev 365 at 394-95 [Macklin,
"STCA"]; Efrat Arbel, "Shifting Borders and the Boundaries of Rights: Examining
the Safe Third Country Agreement between Canada and the United States" (2013)
25:1 IntlJ Refugee L 65 at 70-73.
s STCA, supra note 101, art 4; IRPA Regs, supra note 60, s 159.4(1) (see also ibid, s
159.4(2) for an exception).
"1 Ibid, ss 159.1, 159.5(a)-(d).
120 Ibid, s 159.5(e).
121 Ibid, s 159.5(f)-(g).
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charged with or convicted of an offence that could subject them to the
death penalty."zz
As can be seen in Table 8, according to data obtained from CIC," of
the 2,253 claimants benefiting from exceptions to the STCA at land
ports of entry in 2013, those with anchor family members were by far the
most frequent category (2,215 cases, 98.3%). The next most common
categories were unaccompanied minors (28 cases, 1.2%) and document
holders (8 cases, 0.4%). It would, therefore, be fair to say that claimants
with family members in Canada represent the vast majority of land port
of entry exceptions to the STCA.
3. CONFUSION OVER THE STCA BAR ON RAD APPEALS
As outlined above, refugee claimants excepted from the STCA are
barred from appealing an unsuccessful RPD decision to the
RAD. 124 Unfortunately, cumbersome legislative wording leaves some
ambiguity as to the scope of the bar's application. Specifically, it is
unclear whether the bar applies to all refugee claimants who entered
Canada from the US, or merely those who initiated a claim at land ports
of entry and are subject to one of the land port of entry exceptions.
While a plain reading of the provisions may suggest that the bar applies
to all refugee claimants who entered Canada from the US"15 the RAD
has interpreted its jurisdiction to exclude only those found to fall into
one of the land port of entry exceptions. 126 We do, however, worry about
122 Ibid, s 159.6. Previously, this exception also applied to nationals of countries subject
to moratoriums on removals. However, this exception has been repealed. See
Regulations Amending the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations,
SOR/2009-210, s 1.
123 CR-14-0095, OPS-2014-2109 (25 September 2014) [CIC STCA/DFN Data].
124 See supra note 101.
125 See IRPA, supra note 1, ss 101(1)(e), 110(2)(d); IRPA Regs, supra note 60, ss 159.2,
159.4-159.6.
126 See e.g. Re X, 2015 CanLII 30384 (CA IRB) at paras 25-43. This interpretation of
the RAD's jurisdiction has also been explicitly communicated to potential appellants
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the possibility of the broader plain textual interpretation, which would
significantly expand the application of what is already the most
frequently invoked RAD bar-and which does not appear to have been
the government's intention.127
4. PROBLEMS WITH THE STCA RAD BAR
The primary justification for curtailing full access to Canada's
refugee determination system for those who have entered the country
via the US is to discourage so-called "asylum shopping".128 According to
this reasoning, because the US has a functioning refugee determination
system, claimants who come to Canada via the US could have-and
should have-applied for refugee status in the US rather than in Canada.
If they did not make claims in the US, then this means that they did not
make their refugee claims at the first available opportunity, thus casting
doubts on the bona fides of their claims and suggesting that they
are primarily motivated by economic migration rather than by fears of
persecution. If, on the other hand, they did make claims in the US
and were refused, then in coming to Canada they are essentially seeking a
second kick at the can. Either way, according to this logic, Canada
can legitimately take measures to discourage such claimants from
coming to the country-including through policies that facilitate their
rapid removal.
This rationale is problematic in a number of respects.
by the IRB. Immigration and Refugee Board, Appellants Guide, v 4 (August 2015),
online: <www.irb-cisr.gc.ca>.
12 Julie B&hard & Sandra Elgersma, "Legislative Summary of Bill C-31: An
Act to Amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, the Balanced Refugee
Reform Act, the Marine Transportation Security Act and the Department of
Citizenship and Immigration Act" (Ottawa: Library of Parliament, 2012) at 24,
n 10.
128 See Jennifer Hyndman & Alison Mountz, "Refuge or Refusal: The Geography of
Exclusion" in Derek Gregory & Allan Pred, eds, Violent Geographies: Fear, Terror,
and Political Violence (New York: Routledge, 2007) 77 at 81; Macklin, "STCA",
supra note 117 at 381-82.
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First, one can question the basic premise of the STCA, namely that
both countries are in fact safe for refugees. Such questions can be raised
without necessarily making judgments about the refugee determination
system in either country. Instead, it is sufficient to note that there are
many differences between the two systems, including different
procedures"' and different substantive interpretations of the refugee
definition.o This inevitably means that at least some claimants who
would be recognized in one country would not be recognized in the
other, and would therefore be at risk of chain refoulement. From a
Canadian perspective, the legislation and regulations implementing the
STCA do not include any mechanism to prevent removal from Canada
to the US of individuals at land ports of entry who would be recognized
as refugees in Canada but not in the US-and who would therefore
likely be deported on their return to the US. In other words, through the
STCA, Canada risks doing indirectly what it cannot lawfully do directly:
returning people who meet Canadas refugee definition to their home
countries. Such returns, in our view, breach Canadian constitutional
law.'l To the extent that such returns leave at least some who meet the
international refugee definition unable to fully access all the rights to
129 Consider, for example, the bar on asylum applications for claimants who
have been in the US for over a year-a procedure that has no equivalent
in Canada. See Arbel, supra note 117 at 73-74. For an empirically based critique
of this policy, see Philip G Schrag et al, "Rejecting Refugees: Homeland Security's
Administration of the One-Year Bar to Asylum" (2010) 52:3 Wm & Mary L
Rev 651.
130 Consider, for example, that gender-based persecution (especially involving domestic
violence) became part of Canada's refugee definition while the matter was still
unclear under US law. See Macklin, "STCA", supra note 117 at 405-07.
131 See ibid (especially at 424-26). The legality of the STCA has not yet been
definitively decided by the courts. The Federal Court found that the STCA violates
sections 7 and 15 of the Charter. See Canadian Council for Refugees v Canada, 2007
FC 1262, [2008] 3 FCR 606. However, the Federal Court of Appeal overturned that
decision on procedural grounds without addressing the underlying constitutional
law questions, and the matter has not yet returned before the courts. See Canadian
Councilfor Refugees v Canada, 2008 FCA 229, [2009] 3 FCR 136.
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which they are entitled,32 they also leave Canada in violation of
international law."As such, the STCA RAD bar is premised on a
procedure the lawfulness of which remains contested.
Second, setting aside objections to the STCA itself and assuming
that everyone who would receive refugee protection in Canada
would receive equivalent protection in the US, the notion that
claimants transiting to Canada via the US should have applied
for refugee protection in the US rather than in Canada is problematic.
Under international law, asylum seekers are under no obligation to make
refugee claims in the first available country.'1 Moreover, claimants may
have any number of good reasons for wanting to have their claims heard
in Canada rather than the US (or vice versa). Indeed, the STCA
exceptions themselves recognize that there are circumstances in which it
would be appropriate to allow claimants to make claims in one country
after transiting through the other.135 This is especially evident if one
considers that the STCA exception invoked by the vast majority of
claims at land ports of entry relates to family members in Canada.
Family reunification has long been recognized as a prime-and
legitimate-driver of refugees' choices with respect to their countries
of destination.'6 What is more, family reunification is not only the
rationale underlying the STCA family member exception itself. It is
also codified as a fundamental objective of Canada's immigration
legislation17 and as a basic human right under international law."' In this
132 For an argument to this effect, see e.g. Efrat Arbel & Alletta Brenner, Bordering on
Failure: Canada-US Border Policy and the Politics of Refugee Exclusion (Cambridge,
Mass: Harvard Immigration and Refugee Law Clinical Program, 2013).
1 See Hathway & Foster, supra note 18 at 30-49.
1 Ibid at 30.
115 STCA, supra note 101, art 4.2.
116 For a discussion of the importance of family reunification in the refugee context, see
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "Protecting the Family:
Challenges in Implementing Policy in the Resettlement Context" (June 2001),
online: <www.refworld.org/pdfid/4ae9acal2.pdf>.
117 IRPA, supra note 1, s 3(1)(d).
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context, there is no reason to infer anything untoward from a claimant's
decision to avail himself or herself of an exception to the STCA,
especially of the most commonly invoked exception.-
Third, refugee protection is a forward-looking exercise." Even if one
takes the position that claimants transiting to Canada via the US should
have made their claims in the US rather than Canada, once they are in
Canada the determination of their claim involves a prospective
assessment as to whether they have a well-founded fear of persecution at
the time of the determination.'4' It is worth emphasizing here that, in the
event of removal from Canada after an unsuccessful refugee claim by a
claimant who benefited from an STCA exception, deportation will not
be back to the US. Rather, it will be to the refugee claimant's country of
origin.142 In other words, even if the US was at one point a safe country
for a claimant, at the time of a refugee hearing for a claimant who has
been admitted to Canada through an STCA exception, the US is no
13s See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, GA Res 217A, UN
GAOR, 3rd Sess, UN Doc A/810, art 16(3); International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, 19 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171, arts 17, 23 (entered into force
23 March 1976). See also James C Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under
International Law (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005) [Hathaway,
Rights] at 533-60.
19 This has been noted in the jurisprudence numerous times. See e.g. Alekozai v
Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, 2015 FC 158 at para 12
(CanLIl) [ Alekozai]; Gopalarasa vMinister of Citizenship and Immigation, 2014 FC
1138 (CanLII).
140 See the text accompanying note 2.
141 Mileva v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [ 1991] 3 FC 398 at
404, 81 DLR (4th) 244 (CA).
142 Under Article 5 of the STCA, if a person removed from Canada to the US makes a
refugee claim in the US, they will be returned to Canada. Thus Canada removes
unsuccessful refugee claimants who came to the country via the US directly to their
countries of origin rather than to the US.
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longer accessible." Transit through the US is therefore, by and large,
irrelevant to the forward-looking refugee determination."'
Fourth, there is no empirical evidence suggesting that refugee claims
made by those availing themselves of an exception to the STCA are more
likely to lack merit than are other claims. In fact, the opposite appears to
be the case. While we are not aware of any statistics on recognition rates
for those who entered Canada under an exception to the STCA, we were
able to obtain data about the countries of origin of all such claimants.45
Using this data, Table 9 lists the top ten source countries for claimants
benefiting from an STCA exception in 2013, as well as the average
recognition rates in all claims decided by the RPD under the new system
in 2013 for those countries. As can be seen, several of the top ten
countries, including Syria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Eritrea, have poor
human rights records and high recognition rates. Table 9 also sets out the
weighted country of origin average recognition rates for all claimants
who entered Canada via an STCA exception in 2013 (66.3%), which is
higher than the 60.4% overall recognition rate for new system claims in
the same year.
With all of this in mind, it is difficult to conceive of a justification for
the STCA RAD bar that is about anything more than a simple numbers
game-a mechanism designed to limit the impact of the STCA
exceptions and reduce the number of refugee claimants in Canada,
1 If a claimant went back to a land port of entry and sought admission to the US for
the purposes of making a refugee claim, they would be turned back in accordance
with the terms of the STCA.
'44 A failure to initiate a claim in a safe third country may provide a basis on which to
question refugee claimants about their subjective fear of persecution. See e.g. Toma v
Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, 2014 FC 121 at para 18 (CanLII).
However, the jurisprudence is clear that a failure to claim elsewhere is not, in and of
itself, determinative of a claim to refugee protection. See e.g. Valencia Pena vMinister
of Citizenship and Immigration, 2011 FC 326 at para 4 (CanLII); Alekozai, supra
note 139 at para 12.
145 CIC STCA/DFN Data, supra note 123; IRB RPD/RAD Data, supra note 94.
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irrespective of whether those claims are well founded. One can see this
motivation at play in an internal CIC document on the RAD bars:
The STCA. .. exception[s] [are] quite broad and this has reduced the
effectiveness of the agreement. While exceptions agreed with the U.S.
remain, we propose no access to the RAD for those who were eligible to
make a refugee claim based on the application of one of these exceptions.
Such individuals could have made asylum claims in the United States.
This won't affect the Agreement itself, but will allow us to streamline
these individuals coming from the United States more quicldy.' 6
In our view, then, if there is, as a general matter, merit in having an
appeal mechanism to ensure the correctness of refugee decisions with life
and death consequences, then there is equal merit in extending this
appeal to those who have initiated refugee claims in Canada after
transiting via the US. The lack of justification for the RAD STCA bar,
combined with its application to a large number of claimants (most of
whom are simply exercising their right to family reunification), makes it
imperative, in our view, to reconsider this bar.
146 Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Questions and Answers Related to Changes to
the Refugee System [unpublished-on file with the authors] [emphasis added].
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C. DESIGNATED COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN 4
1. DCOs: THE DCO REGIME
The next-largest group of refugee claimants who are most frequently
barred from accessing the RAD are those who come from a DCO."8
According to CIC, the purpose of the DCO regime is "to deter
abuse of the refugee determination process by people who come from
countries generally considered safe."'4 To this end, the Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration may designate countries as safe,"" which
results in claimants from those countries being denied access to
the RAD.'5 ' In addition, claimants who come from DCOs face
other restrictions, including expedited refugee hearing timelines, 152
no automatic stays of removal pending judicial review, 15 delayed access
to pre-removal risk assessments, 15' delayed access to work permits,15 5
and-at least until this was recently overturned by the courts
14- After this article was written, the Federal Court decided an important case on the
designated country of origin regime, YZ v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2015 FC 892, 387 DLR (4th) 676. For a discussion, see Part V, below.
14s See the text accompanying note 108.
'49 Citizenship and Immigration Canada, "Designated Countries of Origin" (updated
10 October 2014), online: <www.cic.gc.ca>.
iso The term "safe" does not appear in the legislation or regulations. However, the
process is often described as a safe country of origin mechanism, and we therefore
employ this terminology in this article. For a similar approach, see Audrey Macklin,
"A Safe Country to Emulate? Canada and the European Refugee" in Hdlne Lambert
et al, eds, The Global Reach ofEuropean Refugee Law (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 2013) 99 at 101 [Macklin, "Safe Country"].
151 IRPA, supra note 1, ss 107(2), 107.1, 109.1, 110(2)(d.1).
152 Jbid, s 111.1(2); IRPA Regs, supra note 6 0, s 159.9.
153 See the text accompanying notes 86-87.
154 IRPA, supra note 1, ss 112(2)(b.1), (c).
155 IRPA Regs, supra note 60, s 206(2).
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on constitutional grounds56-limits on access to publicly funded
health care.-
2. DCOs: DESIGNATION PROCESS
There are two scenarios where the Minister may designate countries: one
based on quantitative criteria, and the other based on qualitative criteria.
The first scenario allowing for designation is where outcomes in
refugee claims from a country meet quantitative criteria established
through legislation (which sets out quantitative formulas to be
applied"') and Ministerial orders (which assign values to variables in the
legislative formulas'). Under the current Ministerial orders, the
quantitative criteria apply where, during any 12-month period in the
prior three years, the RPD finalized at least 30 refugee claims from a
country. Where a country meets this threshold, the country can only be
designated if, during at least one of the 12-month periods with 30 claims
finalized, the rejection rate (i.e., the sum of rejected, withdrawn, and
abandoned claims, as a proportion of finalized claims) is at least 75% or
the abandon/withdraw rate (i.e., the sum of withdrawn and abandoned
claims, as a proportion of finalized claims) is at least 60%. The legislation
and Ministerial orders do not require the Minister to consider qualitative
criteria if these quantitative criteria are met.
The second scenario allowing for designation is if the quantitative
criteria are not applicable because the country does not meet the
minimum threshold of 30 claims finalized in any 12-month period in the
past three years. In these circumstances, the Minister may designate a
country where, in the Minister's view, three qualitative criteria are met:
(1) the country has an independent judicial system, (2) basic democratic
15 See Canadian Doctors for Refugee Care v Canada (AG), 2014 FC 651, 28 Irnm LR
(4th) 1 [Canadian Doctors].
15- See Order Respecting the Interim Federal Health Program, OC 2012/433, as amended
by OC 2012/945.
1s IRPf, supra note 1, s 109.1(2)(a).
151 Order Establishing Quantitative Thresholds for the Designation of Countries of
Origin, (2012) C Gaz 1, 3378 (IRPA).
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rights and freedoms are recognized in the country and there are
procedures available to seek redress for infringements of those rights and
freedoms, and (3) there are civil society organizations in the country.1 60
It should be emphasized that designation does not occur
automatically for countries that meet the quantitative or qualitative
criteria. Rather, countries that meet the criteria are eligible for
designation at the Minister's discretion.16l There is no guidance in the
legislation or in the Ministerial orders regarding how the Minister
should exercise that discretion.
There are also no provisions in the legislation or in the Ministerial
orders addressing de-designation, nor is there a requirement for ongoing
or periodic reconsideration of designation. It would therefore seem that,
once a country has been designated, it can continue to be designated
even if the quantitative or qualitative criteria that originally allowed for
designation no longer hold.
3. DCOs: QUANTITATIVE CRITERIA
There are, in our view, at least six serious problems with the quantitative
criteria that allow for designation.
The first problem is that, while the quantitative formulas
for designation are established in legislation, because the Minister
sets the values used in the formulas (including the threshold number
of claims and the applicable rates) and can change those values at
any time, the quantitative criteria are entirely discretionary: the Minister
can, by manipulating these values, effectively make any country
vulnerable to designation.
The second problem relates to complications in applying the
legislative formulas. For example, how should outcomes in refugee claims
be counted when claimants are nationals of multiple countries or when
the claimant's country of origin is contested? Similarly, how are
outcomes recorded when RPD decisions are overturned at the RAD or
160 IRPA, supra note 1, s 109.1(2)(b).
161 The legislation indicates that if the criteria are met, the "Minister may ... designate a
country": ibid, s 109.1 [emphasis added].
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the Federal Court (and what should be done pending appeal or judicial
review)? Or what if a claim is granted, but several years later the
claimant's refugee status is vacated due to fraud? These questions could
go on and on. Neither the legislation nor the Ministerial orders provide
any guidance as to how to answer them.
A third problem with the quantitative criteria is that there is a basic
mistake in the legislative formulas: the rejection rate and the
abandonment/withdrawal rates (both of which include abandoned and
withdrawn claims) are calculated with reference to claims finalized
within a 12-month period, without taking into consideration the
number of claims pending at the end of that period. This is a departure
from reporting practices at the United Nations High Commission for
Refugees, which, for reasons that will shortly become clear, report
"recognition rates" as the proportion of positive cases relative to cases
decided on their merits (i.e., excluding withdrawn and abandoned cases),
and which then also separately report the number of claims abandoned
or withdrawn.1"
An analogy may help to show why including abandoned and
withdrawn claims in the rates, while simultaneously failing to consider
pending claims, is misleading. Suppose that there is a footrace with 100
participants. It takes most runners approximately 1 hour to run the race.
By the 30-minute mark, 10 runners have withdrawn from the race and
no runners have yet completed the race. At the 30-minute mark, what
proportion of the runners have dropped out of the race? The answer
should be 10% (10 dropouts out of 100 runners). But that is not how the
legislative formulas for designation work. Instead, the formulas are based
on claims finalized, or, in our analogy, runners for whom a result is
known (i.e., either they dropped out or they completed the race).
According to this formula, the dropout rate would be 100% at the
30-minute mark (10 dropouts out of 10 runners for whom a result is
known). Obviously, this formula does not provide any meaningful
162 See e.g. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR
Statistical Yearbook 2013 (Geneva: UNHCR, 2014), online: <www.unhcr.org/
54cf9bd69.html>.
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information (i.e., what could the 100% dropout rate possibly mean?),
which is why the formula should be viewed as misleading.
Table 10 demonstrates how this can produce misleading results in the
legislative formulas. The table summarizes data obtained from the IRB
about refugee claims from Hungary in 2009.161
At first glance, the table may seem to indicate that claims from
Hungary in 2009 were not well founded, especially given the high
rejection rate (98.9%, or (5 + 259) / 267) and abandon/withdraw rate
(97.0%, or 259 / 267). Not only could Hungary be designated as a safe
country of origin on the basis of these rates, but former Minister Jason
Kenney relied heavily on these very figures to argue that the prior refugee
determination was vulnerable to abuse and in need of reforms along the
lines of the DCO regime. For example:
[Hungary] has become our number one source country for asylum
claims. [In 2009] 97% ... abandon[ed] or withdr[e]w their claims after
they [were] filed saying by their own admission that they actually do not
need Canada's protection. . .. Of the 3% of claims that went on to
adjudication at the IRB, three, not 3%, but three of the 2,500 asylum
claims from Hungary were accepted as being in need of protection. That
is an acceptance rate of nearly 0%.164
However, the rejection rates and abandonment rates cited by the
Minister, which are similar to those used in the legislative formulas, are
misleading. If one takes a closer look at the figures, one sees that what
was really going on during this period was that the RPD scheduled few
hearings for Hungarian claims. Despite the large numbers of Hungarian
claims under consideration in 2009, only 8 hearings on the merits were
scheduled. Meanwhile, the number of abandoned and withdrawn cases
was modest compared to the number of claims under consideration
(9.6%, or 259 / (272 + 2,440)). The vast majority of claims under
consideration were simply pending by the end of 2009 (89.7%, or
163 IRB Country Reports, supra note 91.
16' House of Commons Debates, 40th Parl, 3rd Sess, No 36 (29 April 2010) at 1110. See




2,434 / (272 + 2,440)). Thus, to use our footrace analogy, the Minister's
loud protestations about unfounded Hungarian claims in 2009 are the
equivalent of a sportscaster excitedly castigating the participants in a
footrace for a meaningless 100% dropout rate 30 minutes into the race,
long before most participants (the vast majority of whom were still
running) had the chance to cross the finish line. The same can be said
about the quantitative criteria for designation: the legislative formulas do
not necessarily tell us anything about whether claims for a given country
are likely to be well founded.
A fourth problem with the quantitative criteria relates to the content
of the variables defined in the Ministerial orders, especially the threshold
of 30 claims in any 12-month period. Another analogy may help to
demonstrate the problem with this threshold. Imagine that a newspaper
wants to predict the outcome of a referendum with a binary (i.e., yes or
no) question that requires a bare majority to pass (for the sake of
simplicity, we'll assume a 100% voter turnout). To make this prediction,
the newspaper hires a pollster. The pollster conducts a random poll of 50
voters, of whom 20 intend to vote yes and 30 intend to vote no. Based on
this poll, what prediction should the newspaper make? At first glance,
the newspaper might be tempted to report that there is little chance that
the referendum will pass, as only 40% of voters polled plan on voting yes.
However, a newspaper would normally also report the margin of error
for the poll. To calculate the margin of error, pollsters typically use the
following formula:
f - )where p^ is the sample proportion, n is the sample
T size, and z* is the z-value for the desired confidence
level.
For this poll, this works out to: 40.0% +/- 13.6% (at the 95% confidence
level). Another way of saying this is that, based on the sample size and
the responses to the poll, the newspaper can only be confident that the
actual percentage of voters planning on voting yes in the referendum is
somewhere between 26.4% and 53.6%, 19 times out of 20. Thus, in our
hypothetical example, because the percentage needed for the referendum
to pass (50% + 1) is within the margin of error of the poll (at the 95%
confidence level), the poll is inconclusive.
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Now, with this example in mind, let's return to the formulas allowing
designation. Let's suppose that a country barely meets the criteria for
designation due to the rejection rate-that is to say, in one 12-month
period with only 30 claims finalized, the rejection rate was 75%. Next,
let's suppose that we wanted to know, based on this rate, how likely it is
that any given claim from that country will be unfounded. While we
might be tempted to use a similar type of calculation to work out the
margin of error that would be used in the polling context, we cannot do
so because many of the assumptions that underlie such calculations are
not applicable in this context. First, the rejection rate counts all claims,
not just principal applicant claims. Thus, for example, a family of four
whose claims are rejected in one single decision counts as four rejections,
not as one rejection-and there are some refugee decisions that involve
20 or more extended family members. In other words, the actual sample
size, in terms of independent decisions, is likely smaller than 30 claims,
which is already a very small sample. Second, claims from a country are
not randomly selected. Instead, claimants self-select, and we have no idea
whether claimants who come to Canada in a given 12-month period are
representative of the total pool of potential claimants from that country.
Third, if the country meets the rejection rate in any 12-month period
with 30 claims finalized in the past 3 years (for example, 7 February
2013 to 6 February 2014), the country can be designated, even if in all
other 12-month periods in the past 3 years the rejection rate is lower
than the one set out in the criteria. In other words, the government can
select outlier samples. This means that a 95% confidence level (i.e., 19
times out of 20) is insufficient, but if we significantly increase the
confidence level while keeping the very small sample size, the margin of
error becomes extremely large. Fourth, what we would be trying to infer
from the 75% rejection rate is not how likely it is that past or current
claims from the country are unfounded, but how likely it is that claims
from the country in the indefinite future will be unfounded-knowing
full well that conditions can change dramatically over time. Because of
these considerations, it is very difficult (if not impossible) to determine a
reasonable margin of error or to draw meaningful inferences based on a
single (potentially outlier) rejection rate or abandon/withdrawal rate in
30 decisions in a 12-month period in the previous 3 years.
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These are not merely theoretical points. To the contrary, they have
affected which countries could be designated under the quantitative
criteria over the past several years. Table 11 sets out yearly statistics on
refugee claim acceptance rates for selected countries from 2003 to 2012.
As is evident in the tables, there can be a great deal of variation in rates
for a country over time due to the factors outlined above. For example,
the rejection rate for Morocco was 86.2% in 2003 and 44.3% in 2004,
and the rejection rate for Georgia went from 26.7% in 2008 to 60.7% in
2009. Similarly, the abandon/withdrawal rate for Jordan varied widely,
going from 6.9% in 2006 to 62.3% in 2008 and to 13.3% in 2010. Thus,
a country that meets the DCO quantitative criteria in one year may have
much higher recognition rates in subsequent years, which suggests that
qualifying for designation under the quantitative criteria is not a reliable
indicator that claims in subsequent years are unlikely to be well founded.
It should, moreover, be recalled that the Minister is not required to use
calendar years as the basis for calculating the rates for the relevant
12-month period, whereas the data we used to construct these tables
relied on yearly data. Because the Minister is able to select any 12-month
period in the prior 3 years where 30 or more claims were finalized, the
variability in rates is no doubt more pronounced than the calendar year
data in the tables suggest (in other words, the likelihood of at least one
outlier rate increases as the number of samples increases). And it should
also be recalled that once a country is designated, there is no process in
the legislation or Ministerial orders requiring ongoing or periodic
review-meaning that a country could in principle continue to be
designated for decades based on a single outlier 12-month period.
Beyond just the issue of variability, Table 11 also indicates that some
countries with especially egregious human rights records could qualify
for designation under the quantitative criteria if the DCO regime had
applied during the 2003-2012 period. Perhaps the most extreme
example is North Korea. In 2008, North Korea would have met the
quantitative criteria for designation, even though from 2006 to 2012 the
vast majority (91.9%) of North Korean refugee claims decided on the
merits resulted in grants of refugee protection. The fact that North
Korea could be designated as "safe" by virtue of the quantitative criteria
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is, in our view, perhaps the clearest evidence available showing that the
quantitative criteria are problematic.
A fifth problem with the quantitative criteria relates to potential
disconnects between refugee claim outcomes for a country as a whole
and for subsets of claimants from that country. The problem is this: a
country may be relatively safe for most refugee claimants, thus
potentially leading to high rejection rates overall, while at the same time
being unsafe for particular subsets of claimants, thus leading to higher
recognition rates for that particular subset of claimants. Such a country
may qualify for designation under the quantitative DCO criteria because
the quantitative criteria apply to countries as a whole. This can occur
even if the subset of claimants in question have outcome rates that would
preclude designation if the quantitative criteria were calculated based
only on the subset of claimants and not on all claims from the country.
This problem can be seen by considering two subsets of
claimants: gender- and sexual orientation-based claimants. An earlier
empirical study found that, from 2004 to 2008, gender- and sexual
orientation-based claims were more likely to succeed than other types of
claims made by claimants from the same country.65 Tables 12 and 13 set
out figures from the new system from 2013 and 2014, using data similar
to that used in the earlier empirical study.'66 According to data provided
by the IRB,1 67 in many countries-including countries with low overall
recognition rates-claims categorized by the IRB as involving
gender/age or sexual orientation were much more likely to succeed than
other claims from the same countries. For example, claims involving
gender- or age-based persecution from India were much more likely to
succeed than claims based on other claim types (45.2% versus 14.6%).
Similarly, claims from Jamaica involving sexual orientation succeeded
115 Sean Rehaag, "Do Women Refugee Judges Really Make a Difference? An Empirical
Analysis of Gender and Outcomes in Canadian Refugee Determinations" (2011)
23:2 CJWL 627 at 643.
166 For a discussion of the methodology used and the limitations of this methodology,
see ibid at 637 to 640.
167 IRB RPD/RAD Data, supra note 91.
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much more frequently than other types of claims (70.3% versus 25.6%).
Table 13 also indicates that claims involving either gender/age or sexual
orientation were more likely to succeed under the new system in
2013 and 2014 than would be expected based on country of origin
averages. It seems clear from these tables that low overall recognition
rates for a country do not necessarily mean that sexual orientation- or
gender/age-based claims made from these countries are likely to be
unfounded. No doubt one could make similar points about other subsets
of claimants who may have well-founded claims despite coming from
countries with lower than average recognition rates.
A sixth problem we see with the quantitative criteria is that they
involve stereotypes about refugee claimants. The quantitative criteria
implicitly interpret unsuccessful or abandoned/withdrawn refugee
claims as evidence of abuse of the refugee determination system by
claimants who were in fact safe. This reasoning-and the oft-repeated
language of "bogus" refugee claimants "abusing Canadas generosity" that
accompanies it 68-is deeply flawed. There are any number of reasons
why claimants might abandon claims (for example, because they have
another means to acquire permanent status in Canada) that are entirely
unrelated to the merits of their refugee applications. Moreover, many
claims are denied on the merits not because claimants are safe, but rather
because the genuine harms they fear are not recognized under the
technical and narrow refugee definition. Castigating all such claimants as
fraudsters seeking to abuse the refugee determination system-and
depriving all claimants from particular countries of procedural rights due
to the frequency of such alleged fraud among their co-nationals-is
unfair and perpetuates negative stereotypes about vulnerable groups.69
In sum, the quantitative criteria do not amount to reliable indicators
that countries are safe or that errors in first-instance refugee adjudication
168 See e.g. Citizenship and Immigration Canada, "Speaking Notes for the Honourable
Jason Kenney" (29 June 2012), online: <www.cic.gc.ca/english/department/
media/speeches/2012/2012-06-29.asp>.
1&' Federal Court Justice Mactavish offers an especially compelling analysis of this
problem in Canadian Doctors, supra note 156 at paras 810-48.
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from those countries are likely to be rare or inconsequential. Indeed,
because of problems with the quantitative criteria, countries that are
clearly unsafe and countries that are unsafe for particular groups are
vulnerable to designation, with potentially devastating consequences for
claimants from those countries whose refugee claims are denied in error.
4. DCOS: QUALITATIVE CRITERIA
While we are of the view that the quantitative criteria for designation are
particularly problematic, we also have concerns about the qualitative
criteria. As noted earlier, the qualitative criteria for designation apply
only to countries for which there is no 12-month period in the past 3
years during which at least 30 claims from the country were finalized. In
such circumstances, countries can be designated "if the Minister is of the
opinion that in the country in question (i) there is an independent
judicial system, (ii) basic democratic rights and freedoms are recognized
and mechanisms for redress are available if those rights or freedoms are
infringed, and (iii) civil society organizations exist."17o
In our view, there are at least three problems with the
qualitative criteria.
First, the criteria invite politicization of the refugee determination
process by placing the decision-making powers solely in the hands of the
Minister. In the DCO regime, the question of whether countries meet
the three criteria is left to the Minister's opinion. In forming that
opinion, the Minister will necessarily be making assessments about
conditions in other countries-and these assessments can have
significant political and foreign policy ramifications. What if, for
example, Canada is in the midst of delicate negotiations surrounding a
trade agreement with a particular country? Or what if the political party
in power will be courting a specific demographic community in an
upcoming election? Or how might a Minister's opinion be affected if the
governing political party is seeking to shore up its credentials in terms of
taking tough measures against asylum seekers? It is precisely in order to
ensure that these sorts of political considerations do not enter into
170 IRPA, supra note 1, s 109.1(2)(b).
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refugee decision making that the IRB was created as an independent
quasi-judicial administrative tribunal. To limit the problem of
politicization, a better arrangement would have been to have an
independent body made up of experts in refugee issues and human rights
assess whether qualitative criteria are met.
Second, the qualitative criteria are too vague. This would not be as
much of a problem if the criteria were simply factors aimed at guiding
Ministerial discretion. Instead, however, they are framed as conditions
precedent. As a result, the Minister must make binary assessments of
matters that, because they are vague, inevitably involve questions of
degree. For example, in many circumstances it will not be possible to give
a meaningful yes/no answer to the question of whether a particular
country recognizes basic democratic rights and freedoms and provides
mechanisms for redress if these are infringed. How would one answer
such a question if it were posed about Canada during a period where, say,
same-sex intercourse was a criminal offence, or when marriage could only
take heterosexual forms? Or what if one were asked about whether
Canada currently provides a mechanism for redress for violations of
indigenous rights or for the disproportionate number of murdered or
missing indigenous women in Canada? A binary yes/no answer to these
sorts of questions is, in our view, overly simplistic, and yet making such
simplistic assessments is what the qualitative criteria require the Minister
to do.
Third, the qualitative criteria are surprisingly unconnected to the
refugee definition. For example, the existence of civil society
organizations is mostly irrelevant in the refugee determination process.
Both case law and doctrine have established that the ability of non-state
actors to protect claimants against persecution is not a consideration,
and that, instead, decision makers must focus solely on whether the state
offers protection against persecution.17 1 Indeed, if anything, the existence
of civil society organizations can bolster a refugee claim, such as where
171 See Codogan v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 739 at
para 24, 293 FTR 101; Hathaway & Foster, supra note 18 at 289-92.
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organizations emerge in response to ongoing human rights violations.172
Similarly, the refugee definition looks at whether claimants face a risk of
persecution, not at whether a country recognizes human rights or
whether there are mechanisms for redress. Because of these disconnects
between the qualitative criteria and the refugee definition, the qualitative
criteria do not tell us much about whether a country is likely to generate
well-founded refugee claims.
For these reasons, in our view, the qualitative criteria are problematic
and do not ensure that only safe countries are amenable to designation.
5. DCOs: MINISTERIAL DISCRETION
As noted earlier, countries are not automatically designated when
they meet the qualitative or quantitative criteria. Rather, meeting
the criteria merely allows the Minister to decide whether or not to
designate the country. The Minister therefore has a great deal of
discretion with respect to designation, and both the legislation and the
Ministerial orders are silent regarding how the Minister should exercise
that discretion.
According to a government website, the current practice (which
could be changed at any time at the Minister's discretion) is that
countries meeting the quantitative or qualitative criteria are reviewed
based on the following factors:
democratic governance; protection of right to liberty and security of
the person; freedom of opinion and expression; freedom of religion
and association; freedom from discrimination and protection of
rights for groups at risk protection from non-state actors (which could
include measures such as state protection from human trafficking);
access to impartial investigations; access to an independent judiciary
system; and access to redress (which could include constitutional and
legal provisions). 7 3
12 Macklin, "Safe Country", supra note 150 at 124.
171 Citizenship and Immigration Canada, "Backgrounder: Designated Countries of
Origin" (2 January 2013), online: <www.cic.gc.ca>.
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This review results in a recommendation as to whether to designate the
country, but the final decision on designation rests with the Minister.1t
Some might suggest that the existence of ministerial
discretion-particularly where that discretion is exercised in accordance
with the above criteria-can correct the kinds of defects in the
quantitative and qualitative criteria that we identified in the prior two
sections. According to such an argument, even if the quantitative and
qualitative criteria allow for designation of countries that are not safe, the
Minister will only designate countries that are in fact safe. In our view,
this rationale is flawed for at least two reasons.
First, as with our discussion of the qualitative criteria, we think
that relying on Ministerial discretion risks politicizing the refugee
determination process. Because the assessment of the factors set out
on the government's website is ultimately left to the Minister-rather
than to an independent body of refugee lawyers and human rights
experts-there is a real danger that assessments will be distorted by the
same types of political factors that we raised regarding the qualitative
criteria. This problem of politicization is exacerbated by the lack of
transparency in decision making. The government does not release
assessments or the evidence used in the assessments, and has not located
the list of factors in legislation or regulations. Instead, the government
has left it to the Minister to articulate factors, which can be changed at
any time without seeking any kind of parliamentary approval.
Second, as we will now see, in the first year of operation of the DCO
regime, the Minister did, in fact, designate countries that are unsafe.
6. DCOs: FIRST TWO YEARS OF OPERATION
In the DCO regime's first two years of operation, 42 countries were
designated, 19 through the quantitative criteria 75 and 23 through the
1¾ Ibid. See also IRPA, supra note 1, s 109.1.
1- Croatia, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania,
Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the US were
designated on 15 December 2012; Israel (excluding Gaza and the West Bank) and
Mexico were designated on 15 February 2013; Chile and South Korea were
designated on 31 May 2013; and Romania was designated on 10 October 2014.
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qualitative criteria. 1 6 As can be seen in tables 14 and 15, according to
data provided by the IRB,m- while the number of countries designated
through the quantitative and qualitative criteria are similar, far more
claimants are affected by designation under the quantitative criteria. Of
the 2,084 refugee claims referred to the RPD under the new system in
2013-14 that came from DCOs, 1,977 (94.9%) came from countries
designated by virtue of the quantitative criteria. This is troubling in light
of the problems raised above regarding the quantitative criteria.
It should also be noted that, in the first two years of the DCO
regime's operation, relatively few claimants appear to be directly affected
by the DCO provisions. Only 9.1% of the 22,871 claims referred under
the new system in 2013-14 were from DCO countries. That said, the
mix of countries of origin under the new system differs significantly from
the long-term historical averages. Under the old refugee determination
system (in place from 2003 to 2012), of the 265,728 refugee claims
referred, 75,509 (28.4%) came from countries designated during the first
two years of the DCO regime.
Tables 14 and 15 also indicate that at least some of the designated
countries are not safe, in the sense that some generate significant
numbers of recognized refugees. From 2003 to 2012, 10,150 individuals
obtained refugee protection in Canada from countries that were
designated during the DCO regime's first two years of operation. In
2013-14, under the new refugee determination system, 337 more
claimants from these countries obtained refugee protection.
Most of the recognized refugees from DCO countries came from a
handful of countries. In fact, 94.6% of the recognized refugees from
176 Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg,
Malta, Netherlands, Slovenia, and Sweden were designated on 15 December 2012;
Australia, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, and Switzerland were designated on
15 February 2013; and Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco, and San Marino were
designated on 10 October 2014.
177 IRB Country Reports, supra note 91. Figures are based on all claims referred from
countries that were designated as of 31 December 2014, irrespective of whether the
countries were designated at the time the particular claims from those countries were
referred or finalized.
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these countries from 2003 to 2012 came from Mexico (6,653), Hungary
(1,022), Israel (657),1-8 Romania (479), Czech Republic (281), South
Korea (265) and Poland (242)-and 75.6% came from Mexico and
Hungary alone. Under the new system, in 2013-14, 95.8% of all the
recognized refugees from DCOs came from a small number of countries:
Slovak Republic (126), Hungary (110), Mexico (29), Romania (19),
Croatia (18), Czech Republic (11), and Israel (10). Recognition rates for
some DCO countries were quite high, both from 2002 to 2012 (e.g.,
Romania, 47.9%; Lithuania, 44.3%; Latvia, 44.3%; Estonia, 43.6%) and
in 2013-14 (e.g., Slovak Republic, 66.3%; Romania, 63.3%; Hungary,
59.5%; Israel, 33.3%; Mexico, 29.6%; South Korea, 28.6%). In our view,
it is simply not reasonable to call countries "safe" if they have, in recent
years, produced hundreds if not thousands of recognized refugees.
While we have concerns about many of the countries that have been
designated, we are especially worried about two: Mexico and Hungary.
Both have been major source countries for recognized refugees in
Canada (7,675 refugees were recognized from these countries from 2003
to 2012 and a further 139 were recognized in 2013 and 2014). Both
countries have long been subject to critiques regarding their human
rights records by reputable human rights organizations. Of particular
note is that Mexico continues to persecute sexual minorities, 1-9
systematically fails to address gender-based violence,SO and is confronting
increased violence related to organized crime and corruption.11
Meanwhile, in Hungary, anti-Roma and anti-Semitic persecution is both
in When Israel was designated, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip were excluded from
the DCO regime. The data we received regarding Israel, however, does not
distinguish between claimants from the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, or elsewhere. The
figures regarding Israel should, therefore, be interpreted with caution.
179 See e.g. Egale Canada, Backgrounder, "LGBT Persecution in Mexico and Canada's
Refugee Program" (2013), online: <www.egale.ca>.
Iso See e.g. Nobel Women's Initiative, From Survivors to Defenders: Women
Confronting Violence in Mexico, Honduras & Guatemala (2012), online:
<www.nobelwomensinitiative.org>.
181 See e.g. Human Rights Watch, World Report 2014: Events of2013 (2014) at 265-72,
online: <www.hrw.org>.
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rampant and growing at an alarming rate. 82 Tellingly, however, Canada's
refugee policies were major foreign relations irritants for both
countries.8 3 Moreover, the Canadian government had long held up
Hungarian Roma refugee claimants as an example of abuse of Canada's
refugee determination system." In this context, there was significant
political pressure on the Minister to designate both countries as "safe',
notwithstanding that they cannot, in our view, reasonably be
characterized as such.
All of this to say that we think the DCO regime is fundamentally
flawed. The quantitative criteria are poorly designed, and, as a result,
they allow for designation of unsafe countries. The qualitative criteria
provide excessive discretion to the Minister and are largely disconnected
from the refugee definition. Ministerial discretion-which risks
politicizing the refugee determination process-does not adequately
remedy the problems stemming from these criteria. And the DCO's first
two years of operation confirms that unsafe countries have been
designated, leading to potentially serious consequences for refugee
claimants from DCOs whose first-instance claims have been denied in
error. In our view, then, the entire regime needs to be fundamentally
re-thought. At a minimum, however, access to the RAD for DCO
claimants should be restored. There is no justification for preventing
DCO claimants from accessing an appeal mechanism that is available to
some other claimants to correct false negative refugee determinations
and to prevent Canada from deporting refugees to face persecution and
other serious harms.
182 Franyois-Xavier Bagnoud Center for Health and Human Rights, Harvard School
of Public Health, "Accelerating Patterns of Anti-Roma Violence in Hungary" (2014),
online: <fxb.harvard.edu>. See also Elspeth Guild & Karin Zwaan, "Does Europe
Still Create Refugees? Examining the Situation of the Roma" (2014) 40:1 Queen's
LJ 141.
1.. Macklin, "Safe Country", supra note 150 at 119 (re: Hungary); Steven Chase,
"Harper Blames Canada for Visa Furor", The Globe and Mail (10 August 2009) Al
(re: Mexico).
184 See the text accompanying note 164.
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D. No CREDIBLE BASIS AND MANIFESTLY UNFOUNDED CLAIMS
The next group of claimants who are denied access to the RAD are those
whose claims are declared to have no credible basis or to be manifestly
unfounded. As with other applicants barred from access to the RAD,
such claimants are also denied an automatic stay pending an application
for judicial review in Federal Court.
At first glance, this might seem to be the least objectionable of the
RAD bars. That is because the bar is based not on the claimant's manner
of entry to Canada (unlike STCA exception claimants and DEN
claimants), and not on stereotypes about claimants based on country of
origin (unlike DCO claimants), but on the RPD's judgment that the
claim is either entirely baseless or clearly fraudulent. As we will see,
however, in practice there are problems with this RAD bar.
1. No CREDIBLE BASIS
As was the case under the prior refugee determination process, in
the new system the RPD is required to make NCB declarations if it "is of
the opinion, in rejecting a claim, that there was no credible or
trustworthy evidence on which it could have made a favourable
decision" 11 Case law establishes a high threshold for NCB declarations,
and, as a result, courts have held that the RPD "should not routinely
state that a claim has 'no credible basis"' "'Along similar lines, courts
have held that "if there is any credible or trustworthy evidence that could
support a positive determination the Board cannot find there is no
credible basis for the claim".`-
Given the high threshold for NCB declarations, it is perhaps
unsurprising that such declarations are rare. According to data provided
15 IRPA, supra note 1, s 107(2).
186 Rahaman v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 FCA89 at para
51, [2002] 3 FCR 537.
187 Ramdn Levario v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 314 at
para 19, 9 1mm LR (4th) 198 [emphasis in original].
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by the IRB in response to access to information requests,", of the
134,719 principal applicant refugee determinations made on the merits
under the prior refugee determination system from 2003 to 2012, only
3,669 (2.7%) resulted in NCB declarations. Another way of saying this is
that 97.3% of principal applicant decisions on the merits were implicitly
found to have at least some credible basis. NCB declarations have
continued to be rare under the new system: only 282 (2.6%) of the
10,781 principal applicant refugee decisions finalized on the merits
under the new system in 2013 and 2014 involved NCB declarations.
These figures contradict the exaggerated rhetoric about Canada's refugee
determination process being subject to widespread abuse by fraudulent
claimants in the lead-up to the reforms8?9
While NCB declarations are rare, Tables 16-18 highlight a serious
problem with barring access to the RAD due to such declarations: a
small number of decision makers appear to be especially prone to making
such declarations, thus raising questions about whether access to the
RAD is denied based on the merits of cases or based on who happens to
be assigned to hear cases. For example, from 2003 to 2012, 10 decision
makers who together decided only 3.3% of the total number of principal
applicant cases finalized on the merits were responsible for 31.5% of the
NCB declarations made during this period. These 10 decision makers
were collectively 12.6 times more likely to make such declarations than
their colleagues. Moreover, the massive variations cannot be explained by
differences in the countries of origin in cases decided, or by changes in
decision-making practices over the 10-year period, because variations
persist even when one looks at a single country during a single year. For
instance, Table 18 shows that five decision makers who collectively
decided 12.9% of the Mexican principal applicant cases finalized on the
merits in 2009 were responsible for 71.4% of the NCB declarations in
those cases-and these five decision makers were 15.5 times more likely
to make NCB declarations than their colleagues deciding cases from the
same country in the same year.
I IRB RPD/RAD Data, supra note 94.
189 See the text accompanying note 168.
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In our view, these figures suggest that NCB declarations hinge, at
least in part, on who is assigned to hear a particular case. Moreover,
several of the decision makers who were likely to make NCB declarations
were also outliers in terms of their overall recognition rates, even when
taking country of origin into consideration.o90 This raises the troubling
possibility that outlier decision makers on the negative side-the very
decision makers whose cases one would be especially keen to have
reviewed by a robust appeal process-are also disproportionately likely
to make NCB declarations, which has the consequence of both
preventing claimants from accessing the RAD and removing the
automatic stay on removal pending judicial review. Thus, the RAD bar
for NCB cases may insulate outlier decision makers from administrative
oversight as well as timely and effective court oversight. This could result
in uncorrected false negative refugee determinations. In our view, the
resources saved by eliminating the appeal for the small proportion of
refugee claimants whose claims are declared to have NCB are
outweighed by these risks, and as such the RAD bar for NCB claims
should be revoked.
2. MANIFESTLY UNFOUNDED CLAIMS
MUC declarations are a new feature of Canaas revised refugee
determination system. Under the revised legislation, when the RPD
rejects a refugee claim, "it must state in its reasons for the decision that
the claim is manifestly unfounded if it is of the opinion that the claim is
clearly fraudulent."'9
190 See Nicholas Keung, "Getting Asylum the Luck of the Draw?', Toronto Star (4
March 2011), online: <www.thestar.com>; Nicholas Keung, "Canadian Refugee
Decisions Hinge on Presiding Judge, Says Report", Toronto Star (12 March 2012),
online: <www.thestar.com>; Louise Elliott, "Decisions by Refugee Appeal Division
Members Vary Widely', CBC News (15 December 2014), online: <www.cbc.ca>.
Yearly recognition rates for individual RPD members from 2006 to 2013, including
comparisons to rates that would be expected based on yearly country of averages, are
available at Rehaag, "2013 Statistics", supra note 11.
'91 IRPA, supra note 1, s 107.1.
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The threshold for when MUC declarations are appropriate and the
precise difference between NCB and MUC declarations have not yet
been definitively established. While several published decisions have
resulted in MUC declarations,"' none of those cases offers an extended
analysis of exactly what "clearly fraudulent" means for the purposes of
MUC declarations. In our view, the threshold should, as with NCB
declarations, be high, in light of the serious consequences of MUC
declarations. In addition, the use of the term "clearly" suggests that
MUC declarations ought to be assessed against a particularly demanding
standard of proof. Moreover, the use of the term "fraudulent", instead of
"misrepresentation", which is found throughout Canada's immigration
legislation, suggests that direction should be taken from criminal law
provisions relating to fraud. At any rate, it is problematic that the
published cases do not bother to explain how the test for MUC
declarations should be understood. Hopefully the Federal Court will
have the opportunity to address this question soon-though the
impediments to judicial review for MUC cases mean that it may take
some time for the matter to come before the courts.
According to data provided by the IRB in response to an access to
information request,"' there were only 107 MUC declarations in
principal applicant refugee determinations in 2013 and 2014 under the
new system. To put these figures in context, according to the same data
there were 10,781 principal applicant claims finalized on the merits in
2013 and 2014 under the new system, meaning that less than 1.0% of
these claims resulted in MUC declarations.
Because of the very small number of MUC declarations, it is not yet
possible to discern patterns in decision making in this area. As with the
low rates of NCB declarations, however, the rarity of MUC declarations
192 See e.g. X (Re), 2014 CanLII 60277 (RPD); X (Re), 2014 CanLII 47709 (RPD);
X (Re), 2013 CanLII 94680 (RPD); X (Re), 2014 CanLII 51668 (RPD); X (Re),
2013 CanLII 76396 (RAD); X (Re), 2013 CanLII 76395 (RAD); X (Re), 2013
CanLII 69347 (RAD); X (Re), 2014 CanLII 68371 (RAD); X (Re), 2013 CanLII
76472 (RAD).
193 IRB RPD/RAD Data, supra note 94.
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suggests that fraud is not a significant problem in Canada's refugee
determination process, notwithstanding government rhetoric to the
contrary. It also indicates that very few resources are saved by depriving
applicants whose cases are "clearly fraudulent" from access to the RAD.
In this context, we think little is gained by the RAD bar for cases where
there is a MUC declaration. We also worry that, between the lack of
clarity regarding the test for MUC declarations and the pattern
identified above regarding outlier decision makers and NCB
declarations, the RAD bar in MUC cases risks insulating outlier decision
makers from administrative and court oversight. Thus, as with NCB
declarations, we believe the risks outweigh the limited cost savings and
that this RAD bar should be repealed.
E. DESIGNATED FOREIGN NATIONALS
The final RAD bar that we will discuss is, like the STCA bar, based solely
on a refugee claimant's mode of entry into Canada-the so-called
Designated Foreign National category. This category is, to date, the least
utilized of the RAD bars.
1. DFNS: THE DFN REGIME
The DFN regime is an attempt to deter human smuggling. It is a
direct response to the arrival of two boats off the coast of British
Columbia-the Ocean Lady, carrying 76 Sri Lankan Tamil passengers in
2009, and the Sun Sea, carrying 492 Tamil passengers in 2010.9 The
regime gives the Minister of Public Safety the authority to designate the
arrival of a group of two or more persons in Canada as an "irregular
arrival" if the Minister believes that examinations of those in the group
cannot be conducted in a timely manner, or if the Minister has
19' See Ian Bailey & Gloria Galloway, "Kenney Insists on Smuggling Crackdown', The
Globe and Mail (22 October 2010) A9. The regime was first proposed in Bill C-49,
An Act to amend the Immigration and Refigee Protection Act, the Balanced Refugee
Reform Act and the Marine Transportation Security Act, 3rd Sess, 40th Parl, 2010.
The provisions were then included in the reforms to Canada's refugee determination
system in 2012. See PCISA, supra note 21, s 10.
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reasonable grounds to suspect that the group arrived in connection with
a contravention of human smuggling laws for profit or in association
with a criminal or terrorist organization.115 When a designation is made,
a foreign national who is part of the designated group becomes a DFN. 16
While the DFN regime was ostensibly created to respond to large-scale
smuggling events, the broad wording of the provision potentially
captures a much larger number of arrival scenarios.
Designation carries with it several serious consequences. DFNs
who are 16 years of age or older are mandatorily detained and have
less frequent access to detention reviews than other detained
non-citizens have."All DFNs-even those whose refugee claims are
accepted-are also barred from applying for permanent resident status in
Canada for a period of at least 5 years."9 DFNs are similarly barred from
seeking relief on humanitarian and compassionate grounds for
5 years. "' These provisions have the effect of delaying DFNs
from obtaining any kind of permanent status, and they also prevent them
from being reunited with family members abroad for a much longer
period of time, as sponsorship applications may not be submitted until
permanent residence has been obtained. They also leave DFNs who are
recognized as refugees vulnerable to loss of refugee protection and
removal from Canada in the event that conditions improve in their
home countries. 200 After their release from detention, DFNs also face
mandatory reporting requirements that continue until they receive
permanent resident status. 2 0 DFNs who are found to be refugees are also
barred from obtaining a refugee travel document."" Finally, and most
115 IRPA, supra note 1, s 20.1(1).
196 Ibid, s 20.1(2).
197 Ibid, ss 55(3.1), 56(2), 57, 57.1.
19 Ibid, ss 11(1.1-1.3).
19 Ibid, ss 25(1.01-1.03).
20(1 Ibid, s 108 (1) (e).
2011 Ibid, s 98.1; IRPA Regs, supra note 60, s 174.1.
202 IRPA, supra note 1, s 31.1.
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relevant for present purposes, DFNs are barred from appealing negative
refugee determination decisions to the RAD 2013 and face removal with no
access to a statutory stay of removal pending judicial review of negative
refugee determinations.204
On 4 December 2012, the Public Safety Minister made the first
use of the DFN regime, designating five separate arrivals that had
taken place between February and October 2012. The designations did
not involve the large-scale arrival of smuggling ships. They instead
consisted of several discrete interceptions at Canadian land borders,
resulting in a total of 43 refugee claimants becoming subject to the RAD
bar on this basis.25
2. DFNS: PUNISHING THE SMUGGLED
The DFN regime is a penalizing one, meant primarily to deter
the "irregular arrival" of asylum seekers and other migrants. This is
not speculation. The government itself has stated that its main
justification is one of deterrence. For example, in an Operational Bulletin
on DFNs, the government explains that the "five-year bar on
[applications for permanent residence] by DFNs is intended to act as a
deterrent to those considering coming to Canada as part of an irregular
arrival.""6 Similarly, in a Parliamentary summary of the regime, it was
readily acknowledged that a "key objective" was "to deter large-scale
events of irregular migration to Canada, particularly where these involve
human smuggling."207
203 id, s 110(2)(a).
204 See the text accompanying note 87.
205 IRPA-Desgnations as Irregular Arrivals, (15 December 2012) C Gaz I, 3386-88
(Government Notices). See also the text accompanying note 108.
206 Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Operational Bulletin 440-D, "Designated
Foreign Nationals: Restrictions on Applications for Permanent Residence" (30
August 2012), online: <www.cic.gc.ca>.
207 Julie Bachard, "Legislative Summary of Bill C-4: An Act to amend the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act, the Balanced Refugee Reform Act and the Marine
Transportation SecurityAct" (Ottawa: Library of Parliament, 2012) at 2.
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Setting aside broader questions about whether Canada may
legitimately carry out measures to deter large-scale smuggling
involving would-be refugee claimants,"' our primary concern with
the DFN regime and its corresponding RAD bar is that, instead of
targeting the organizers of such events, the regime targets passengers,
most of whom assert a fear of persecution if returned to their
countries of origin. The right to seek asylum is deeply embedded in
international law.209 International law also recognizes that refugees must
frequently engage in irregular migration to assert this right and states
should not, therefore, impose penalties on refugees on account of their
illegal entry into a country of asylum.' Because the DFN regime
uses penalties for the irregular arrival of refugees-including the RAD
bar-as a way to discourage human smuggling, the DFN regime
contravenes international law.
It is, moreover, worth noting that there has never been even a
pretense that the DFN regime and its corresponding RAD bar are
connected to the merits of DFN refugee claims. That is to say,
the concern is not that too many people are making unfounded
refugee claims after arriving in Canada with the assistance of
human smugglers. Rather, the concern is that, irrespective of whether
would-be refugee claimants have well-founded claims, they should be
discouraged from coming to the country through human smuggling.
That this is the real concern is evidenced by the fact that the DFN
regime imposes some penalties that apply only to DFNs who succeed
208 For discussions of these broader questions, see e.g. Macklin, "STCA" supra note 117;
Janet Dench & Franyois Crpeau, "Interdiction at the Expense of Human Rights: A
Long-Term Containment Strategy" (2003) 21:4 Refuge 2; Andrew Brouwer &
Judith Kumin, "Interception and Asylum: When Migration Control and Human
Rights Collide" (2003) 21:4 Refuge 6; Frangois Cripeau & Delphine Nakache,
"Controlling Irregular Migration in Canada: Reconciling Security Concerns with
Human Rights Protection" (2006) 12:1 IRPP Choices.
209 Universal Declaration ofHuman Rzghts, supra note 138, art 14.
210 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS
150, art 31 (entered into force 22 April 1954). For a general discussion, see
Hathaway, Rights, supra note 138 at 370-439.
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with their refugee claims (such as the 5-year bar on applying for
permanent residence after a successful refugee claim). In the context of
the RAD bar, this is especially problematic because the bar limits access
to measures to challenge incorrect or unlawful denials of refugee
protection for a group of claimants, not on the basis of anything related
to the merits of the claims by those in the group, but rather on the basis
of their mode of entry to Canada.
Worse yet, because DFNs are subject to mandatory detention, they
are highly vulnerable to miscarriages of justice in respect of their
RPD refugee determinations. Under the new system for refugee
determination in Canada, refugee determinations are now rendered very
quickly-usually within 60 days of receipt of the claimant's initiating
forms."' Given these compressed timelines, detained refugee claimants
are severely hampered in their ability to obtain and instruct counsel,
collect evidence, and prepare for their hearing."' Moreover, if the Sun
Sea and Ocean Lady incidents are reliable indicators, refugee claims
involving mass irregular arrivals will often involve difficult legal and
factual questions that pose challenges for fair and consistent
RPD decision making."' In this context, it is our view that DFNs are,
if anything, more in need of a full appeal on the merits than other
refugee claimants are.
211 See the text accompanying note 60.
212 See Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Addendum: Visit to
Canada, UNCHR, 62nd Sess, UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/7/Add.2 (5 December
2005), online: <www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Detention/Pages/Annual.aspx>; see also
Global Detention Project, "Canada Detention Profile" (July 2012),
online: <www.globaldetentionproject.org>.
213 The refugee claims of passengers who arrived on the Sun Sea and the Ocean Lady
have now been extensively litigated in the Federal Court, and several of the cases
raise complex issues of law. These include whether asylum seekers themselves
engaged in smuggling by helping the ships' operation and whether mere voyage on
the ships gave rise to a well-founded fear of persecution because of the Sri Lankan
government's perception that the ships were organized by the Tamil Tigers. See e.g.
B010 v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FCA 87, 359 DLR
(4th) 730; Minister of Citizenship and Immigration vB344, 2013 FC 447 (CanLIl).
VOL 49:1260
2016 ASSESSING THE LIMITS ON APPEAL RIGHTS
In our view, then, the entire DFN regime is problematic on various
levels and should be reconsidered. At a minimum, however, the DFN
RAD bar should be dropped.
IV. CONCLUSION
Refugee adjudication is a complex, high-volume, and high-stakes
undertaking. That is a fraught combination. Under Canada's new
refugee determination regime it is also an undertaking that proceeds at a
near-frantic pace. The potential for error in this context is very real. In
this article, we have illustrated the importance of adequate appeal
mechanisms for first-instance refugee determinations and highlighted
the early success of the RAD. At the same time, we lament the extent to
which this success is tempered by the bars on access to the RAD. These
bars bear little, if any, connection to the merits of the claims of those
subject to them. They are born of faulty premises and conceptual errors,
and they unlawfully penalize refugees for asserting their protected right
to seek asylum. In creating the RAD, the Canadian government has
recognized that appeals of refugee decisions are important. Now the
government must also recognize that such appeals are equally important
for all refugee claimants.
V. UPDATE: YZ V CANADA
After this article was written, the Federal Court decided an important
case on the subject of RAD bars: YZ v Canada (Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration).1 In that case, the Court found that the bar on RAD
access for DCO claimants is unconstitutional due to a violation of the
equality provisions in section 15 of the Charter in a manner that cannot
be saved by section 1 of the Charter.215 The government has indicated
that it intends to appeal the decision.'
214 2015 FC 892, 387 DLR (4th) 676 [YZv Canada].
215 Ibid at paras 102-31, 144-70.
216 See Nicholas Keung, "Court Rules Denial of Appeals for 'Safe Country' Refugees
Unconstitutional", Toronto Star (23 July 2015), online: <www.thestar.corn>.
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On the section 15 equality argument, the Court rejected the
government's contention that the distinctions made between DCO and
non-DCO claimants merely reflect that DCO claimants are relatively
safe from persecution and other harms, as informed by statistical
generalizations and thorough reviews of country conditions.17 Rather,
the Court noted that, according to the government, one of the principal
reasons for the DCO regime was to "deter abuse of [the] refugee
system".21 The Court found that attempting to deter abuse of the refugee
system by creating two different classes of refugee claimants based on
country of origin, with procedural advantages provided to one of those
classes, was "discriminatory on its face.""' In other words, according to
the Court, the DCO RAD bar treats claimants differently based on
country of origin, not based on relative safety from persecution and
other harms. The Court further found that the distinction between
DCO and non-DCO claimants "serves to further marginalize, prejudice,
and stereotype refugee claimants from DCO countries" and "perpetuates
a stereotype that refugee claimants from DCO countries are somehow
queue-jumpers or 'bogus' claimants who only come here to take
advantage of Canada's refugee system and its generosity."22( As such, the
Court found that the DCO RAD bar constitutes discrimination on the
basis of national origin, and thereby violates section 15 of the Charter.
The Court then went on to examine whether this violation could be
saved by section 1 as a reasonable limit on Charter rights that is
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. In this regard,
the Court held that the government failed to establish that the RAD bar
is minimally impairing in achieving the stated objective of deterring
fraudulent refugee claims."' In its reasoning on this point, the Court
placed particular emphasis on the existence of bars on appeals for claims
217 See YZ v Canada, supra note 214 at para 124.
218 Ibid at para 7 (Evidence of Teny Dikranian, Respondent's witness).
219 YZ v Canada, supra note 212 at para 124.
22(1 Ibid [citations omitted].
221 Ibd at paras 162-64.
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found to have no credible basis or to be manifestly unfounded-which
means that the RAD bar for DCO claimants only impacts claimants
whose claims have a credible basis and are not manifestly unfounded. In
these circumstances, the Court held that the government failed to
demonstrate that the DCO RAD bar was needed in order to deter
fraudulent refugee claims.m
While YZ is an important development, it leaves several issues
unresolved, three of which are particularly germane to this article.
First, notwithstanding the applicants' attempts to challenge the
DCO regime generally, the Court confined its ruling to the
constitutionality of the DCO RAD bar. As a result, while the Court
referred to criticisms of the DCO designation mechanisms, including
some of the critiques we have set out above, it did not engage with these
critiques in a sustained manner. The Court also sidestepped the
applicants' arguments under section 7 of the Charter, as it found that
these arguments were primarily related to the designation mechanisms.224
All of this is, in our view, unfortunate. There was a robust evidentiary
record-both on the part of the applicants and on the part of the
government-available that would have allowed the Court to examine
the constitutionality of the DCO regime more generally.225 Unless a
different approach is taken on appeal, it would appear that the
constitutionality of that broader regime will need to be tested through
future litigation. Such future litigation will impose significant-and
largely unnecessary-costs on the Department of Justice, on legal aid
programs that fund test cases, on the courts, and potentially on DCO
claimants who will continue to be subject to a regime of questionable
constitutionality until this matter is ultimately decided.
Second, as noted above, the Court's conclusion that the DCO RAD
bar is unlawfully discriminatory is predicated at least in part on the
222 Ibid at paras 164-65.
223 Ibid at paras 15-23, 142.
224 Ibid at para 142.
225 Ibid at paras 44-101.
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existence of the parallel appeal bar for claims found to have no credible
basis or to be manifestly unfounded. We understand the logic underlying
the court's findings-that the government's objective of addressing the
problem of "bogus" claims is more appropriately met through the MUC
and NCB bars than through making broad distinctions between
claimants based on national origin. However, as we have argued above,
the MUC and NCB bars suffer from their own infirmities. We think the
Court could easily have come to the same conclusion without relying on
the existence of these problematic RAD bars.
Third, as we have shown in this article, the SCTA bar is the RAD bar
that affects the largest number of claimants. Testing the constitutionality
of this bar is, in our view, a matter of some urgency.
VI. TABLES
Table 1: Overview of outcomes under old and new system
Year Referred Accepted Rejected Abandoned/ Finalized Recogn'n
Withdrawn Rate
2008 34,800 7,554 6,784 3,774 18,112 52.7
2009 33,970 11,154 9,796 5,702 26,652 53.2
2010 22,543 12,305 13,642 6,510 32,457 47.4
2011 24,981 12,983 16,122 5,151 34,256 44.6
2012 20,223 10,294 14,448 4,697 29,439 41.6
2013 (New system only) 9,738 2,988 1,957 527 5,472 60.4
2014 (New system only) 13,133 7,042 3,908 660 11,610 64.3
New System (2013-14) 22,871 10,030 5,865 1,187 17,082 63.1
Source: IRB Country Reports (AT/P A-2013-OO193, A-2013-02091 &A-2014-04296)
Table 2: Top 10 countries (by claims finalized) under new system (2013-14)
Abandoned/ Recogn'n 2012Country Referred Accepted Rejected Withdrawn Finalized Rate Recogn'n
Rate
CHINA 2,154 782 670 81 1,533 53.9 41.7
PAKISTAN 1,413 924 171 29 1,124 84.4 73.3
SYRIA 1,067 838 34 13 885 96.1 82.0
COLOMBIA 1,094 466 358 34 858 56.6 39.7
NIGERIA 1,045 386 365 15 766 51.4 57.3
AFGHANISTAN 787 489 78 46 613 86.2 84.1
HAITI 681 243 288 10 541 45.8 48.6
IRAQ 771 389 55 41 485 87.6 72.6
DEM REP CONGO 564 219 182 37 438 54.6 63.2
EGYPT 511 382 45 4 431 89.5 76.1
All Countries (2013) 9,738 2,988 1,957 527 5,472 60.4 N/A
All Countries (2014) 13,133 7,042 3,908 660 11,610 64.3 N/A
All Countries(2013-14) 22,871 10,030 5,865 1,187 17,082 63.1 N/A
Source: /RB Country Reports (AT/P A-2013-02091 & A-2014-04296)
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Table 3: Top 10 extreme variance between actual and expected recognition rate based on COO averages in
new system principal applicant cases finalized on the merits (2013-14)
RPDMember* Accepted Rejected Finaized Recogn'n Rectedn on
Rate (COO)**
TIWARI, RABIN 167 27 194 86.1 59.1 27.0
BOUSFIELD, JOEL 127 35 162 78.4 59.1 19.3
MARCINKIEWICZ, CHRISTOPHER 73 12 85 85.9 68.0 17.9
SOMERS, MICHAEL 150 40 190 78.9 63.2 15.8
ROCHE, PATRICK 156 32 188 83.0 67.8 15.2
VEGA, MARIA 65 16 81 80.2 65.1 15.2
RAYMOND, CATHERINE 66 23 89 74.2 60.2 14.0
DOOKUN, MICHELLE 63 29 92 68.5 55.3 13.2
FABER, PAULA 93 34 127 73.2 60.9 12.3
CUNDAL, KERRY 128 46 174 73.6 61.4 12.1
THIBAULT, MARIE-LYNE 43 68 111 38.7 53.8 -15.1
ALARY, SUZANNE 56 71 127 44.1 60.1 -16.0
CASSANO, NATALKA 39 48 87 44.8 60.9 -16.0
DORTELUS, HARRY 57 101 158 36.1 53.5 -17.4
DAUBNEY,JENNIFER 74 79 153 48.4 66.6 -18.2
LLOYD, BRENDA 32 91 123 26.0 46.5 -20.5
MAZIARZ, TERESA 29 54 83 34.9 56.2 -21.3
GULLICKSON,JEFFREYBRIAN 45 87 132 34.1 55.4 -21.3
WITTENBERG, CLAIRE 21 38 59 35.6 59.2 -23.6
MORIN,STEPHANE 9 49 58 15.5 48.0 -32.5
All Members (2013-14) 6,610 4,171 10,781 61.3 61.3 0.0
Source: IRB RPD/RAD Data (AT/P A-2014-04109)
*Members deciding50+cases
-Expected Recognition Rates calculated basedonweighted countryoforigin averages incases finalizedon merits
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Table 4: Outcomes in new system principal applicant claims from China,
by RPD Member (2013-14)
RPD Member* Accepted Rejected Finalized Recognition(Merits) Rate
TIWARI, RABIN 31 2 33 93.9
SOMERS, MICHAEL 39 6 45 86.7
SEYAN, RAVI 19 5 24 79.2
PEARSON, HEATHER 22 8 30 73.3
ROCHE, PATRICK 19 7 26 73.1
JUNG, ALICE 26 12 38 68.4
SPRUNG, HEIDI 15 7 22 68.2
KHAMSI, KHAMISSA 17 8 25 68.0
RILEY, ROBERT 18 10 28 64.3
CARTY, MAUREEN 16 10 26 61.5
BOUSFIELD, JOEL 16 12 28 57.1
ANDREWS, TANYA 12 11 23 52.2
DALRYMPLE, JOSEPH 15 14 29 51.7
GREENWOOD, KAREN 10 12 22 45.5
STOCKS, NAMIJI 11 15 26 42.3
POPATIA, BERZOOR 8 14 22 36.4
BOOTHROYD, KEVIN 11 20 31 35.5
MORGAN, SARAH 10 21 31 32.3
DAUBNEY,JENNIFER 9 19 28 32.1
CASSANO, NATALKA 10 24 34 29.4
MURATA, JESSICA 8 24 32 25.0
OADEER, NADRA 4 16 20 20.0
WAGNER, JULIE 4 17 21 19.0
CUKAVAC, HILDA 3 17 20 15.0
All Members (China) 353 311 664 53.2
Source: IRB RPD/RAD Data (AT/PA-2014-04109)
*Members deciding 20+cases from China
Table 5: RAD outcomes in principal applicant appeals (2013-14)*
DecisionType Decision Claimantas Ministeras Total
Appellant Appellant
Administrative 6 0 6
Appeal not perfected 181 1 182
Procedurally Deceased 1 0 1
Dismissed Lack ofJurisdiction 292 4 296
Withdrawn /Abandoned 36 13 49
Subtotal 516 18 534
Allowed (referred back) 274 12 286
Allowed (substituted decision) 68 19 87
Decided on Dismissed (other reasons) 25 2 27
Merits Dismissed (same reasons) 925 8 933
Dismissed (NCB declaration) 4 0 4
Subtotal 1,296 41 1,337
Total 1,812 59 1,871
Source: IRB RPD/RAD Data (A7PA-2014-04109)
* Excludingcases with duplicate entries for a single RAD number
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Table 6: Outcomes in principal applicant RAD appeals brought by claimants and finalized on merits,
by RAD Member (2013-14)*
RAD Member** Allowed Dismissed Finalized (Merits) Grant Rate
ZICHERMAN, DORIS 4 0 4 100.0
DHIR, RENA 5 5 10 50.0
MACAULAY, PHILIP 20 27 47 42.6
FORBES, CATHRYN 16 22 38 42.1
KULAR, SUSAN 12 18 30 40.0
DE ANDRADE, MARIA 9 16 25 36.0
BOSVELD, EDWARD 47 84 131 35.9
ATKINSON, KEN 10 19 29 34.5
LOWE, DAVID 4 8 12 33.3
MORRISH, DEBORAH 2 4 6 33.3
AHARA, ROSLYN 21 45 66 31.8
BISSONNETTE, ALAIN 49 113 162 30.2
UPPAL, ATAM 24 62 86 27.9
LEDUC, NORMAND 37 96 133 27.8
MCSWEENEY, DANIEL 25 69 94 26.6
PETTINELLA, MICHELE 2 6 8 25.0
ISRAEL, MILTON 17 57 74 23.0
FORTNEY,DOUGLASBRUCE 8 28 36 22.2
KINGMA, MARYANNE 2 8 10 20.0
FAVREAU, LEONARD 13 74 87 14.9
GARNER, ROBERTS. 1 8 9 11.1
AGOSTINHO, LUIS F. 6 69 75 8.0
GALLAGHER, STEPHEN 7 91 98 7.1
SOKOLYK, DIANE E 1 15 16 6.3
BRYCHCY, ANNA 0 10 10 0.0
Total 342 954 1,296 26.4
Source: IRB RPD/RAD Data (ATIP A-2014-04109)
* Excluding cases with duplicate entries for a single RAD number
** First RAD Member listed in the IRB database for each case




Safe Third CountryAgreement Exception** 2,253 23.1
Designated Country of Origin* 468 8.6
No Credible Basis/ Manifestly Unfounded Claim*** 120 2.2
Designated Foreign National** 43 0.4
New System Claims Finalized 5,472 N/A
New System Claims Referred 9,738 N/A
Source: IRB RAD Bars (A-2014-02030), IRB Country Reports (A-2013-02091)
*Claims may be subjectto multiple RAD Bars
** Based on claims referred in 2013
**Based on claims finalized in 2013
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Table 8: Refugee claims processed at land POEs, by STCA exception type (2013)
ExceptionType Number Percentage(ofExcepted)
"Anchor"familymember 2,215 98.3
Citizen/permanent resident 1,478 65.6




Unaccompanied minor 28 1.2
Document holder 8 0.4
Moratorium country* 2 0.1
Public interest (death penalty) 0 0.0
Total (STCA exceptions) 2,253 100.0
Missingorinvalid 738 N/A
Total (Land POEclaims) 2,991 N/A
Source CICSTCA/DFN Data (CR-14-0095, OPS-2014-2109)
Table 9: Top 10 countries for cases referred through STCA exceptions (2013)






Congo, Dem Rep 102 59.9





Total (STCA exceptions) 2,253 66.3**
Total (AlI RPD claims) 9,738 60.4
Source: CICSTCA/DFN Data (CR-14-0095, OPS-2014-2109) & IRB Country Reports (A-
2013-02091)
Based on all RPD claims in 2013, not just STCAexceptions
** Based on weighted country recognition rates, excluding65 claims from countries
with no claims finalized on merits in 2013








Recognition Rate (%) 37.5
Rejection Rate (C-31)(%) 98.9
Abandon/Withdraw Rate (C-31)(%) 97.0
Source: IRB Country Reports (ATIPA-2013-00193)
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Table 11: Overview of refugee claims from selected countries (2003-2012)
Abandoned Recogn'n Reject'n Abandon/
Country Year Referred Accepted Rejected / Finalized Rate Rate Withdraw
Withdrawn (C31) Rate (C31)
2003 53 39 25 4 68 60.9 42.6 5.9
2004 49 28 26 4 58 51.9 51.7 6.9
2005 57 42 9 3 54 82.4 22.2 5.6
2006 74 35 15 5 55 70.0 36.4 9.1
2007 56 20 16 5 41 55.6 51.2 12.2
Georgia 2008 86 22 6 2 30 78.6 26.7 6.7
2009 67 24 25 12 61 49.0 60.7 19.7
2010 88 35 31 10 76 53.0 53.9 13.2
2011* 56 22 69 12 103 24.2 78.6 11.7
2012 87 25 41 17 83 37.9 69.9 20.5
Total 673 292 263 74 629 52.6 53.6 11.8
2003 172 29 34 14 77 46.0 62.3 18.2
2004 104 76 95 17 188 44.4 59.6 9.0
2005 39 50 35 16 101 58.8 50.5 15.8
2006 79 34 20 4 58 63.0 41.4 6.9
2007 83 14 10 6 30 58.3 53.3 20.0
Jordan 2008* 118 11 9 33 53 55.0 79.2 62.3
2009 78 25 30 23 78 45.5 67.9 29.5
2010 49 37 54 14 105 40.7 64.8 13.3
2011 78 39 53 14 106 42.4 63.2 13.2
2012 53 17 30 4 51 36.2 66.7 7.8
Total 853 332 370 145 847 47.3 60.8 17.1
2003 2 1 1 3 5 50.0 80.0 60.0
2004 0 0 0 2 2 N/A 100.0 100.0
2005 1 1 0 0 1 100.0 0.0 0.0
2006 25 0 0 0 0 N/A N/A N/A
North 2007 109 1 0 9 10 100.0 90.0 90.0
Korea 2008* 30 7 1 22 30 87.5 76.7 73.3
2009 43 66 8 41 115 89.2 42.6 35.7
2010 177 42 2 14 58 95.5 27.6 24.1
2011 385 117 12 41 170 90.7 31.2 24.1
2012 719 230 18 42 290 92.7 20.7 14.5
Total 1,491 465 42 174 681 91.7 31.7 25.6
2003* 51 8 35 15 58 18.6 86.2 25.9
2004 42 34 23 4 61 59.6 44.3 6.6
2005 42 17 13 3 33 56.7 48.5 9.1
2006 38 15 17 2 34 46.9 55.9 5.9
2007 44 17 10 5 32 63.0 46.9 15.6
Morocco 2008 37 14 6 10 30 70.0 53.3 33.3
2009 50 14 9 8 31 60.9 54.8 25.8
2010 35 10 6 12 28 62.5 64.3 42.9
2011 44 20 21 8 49 48.8 59.2 16.3
2012* 40 13 21 21 55 38.2 76.4 38.2
Total 423 162 161 88 411 50.2 60.6 21.4
Source: IRB Country Reports (AT/P A 2013-001 93)
*Meets quantitative criteria
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Table 12: Outcomes in new system principal applicant claims from selected countries,
by selected claim types (2013-14)
Country Claim Type* Accepted Rejected Finalized Recognition(Merits) Rate
Gender/Age [ 16 12 1 28 57.1
Algeria Sexual Orientation 1 15 4 1 19 1 78.9
OtherClaimTypes 1 15 42 1 57 1 26.3
1 Gender/Age [ 65 29 1 94 ] 69.1
Haiti Sexual Orientation 1 1 1 1 2 1 50.0
OtherClaimTypes 1 121 185 1 306 1 39.5
1Gender/Age 1 14 1 17 1 31 45.2
India JSexual Orientation 1 5 7 1 12 1 41.7
OtherClaimTypes 1 25 146 1 171 1 14.6
1Gender/Age [ 16 20 1 36 ] 44.4
Jamaica Sexual Orientation 1 90 38 1 128 1 70.3
OtherClaimTypes 1 11 32 1 43 1 25.6
[Gender/Age 1 11 1 2 1 13 84.6
Russia Sexual Orientation 1 50 3 1 53 1 94.3
OtherClaimTypes 1 20 14 1 34 1 58.8
1Gender/Age [ 8 12 1 20 ] 40.0
Saint Lucia Sexual Orientation 1 19 13 J 32 J 59.4
OtherClaimTypes 0 15 15 0.0
Gender/Age 14 16 30 46.7
Saint Vincent SexualOrientation 12 16 28 42.9
OtherClaimTypes 3 23 26 11.5
Gender/Age 24 7 31 77.4
Ukraine Sexual Orientation 1 57 4 61 93.4
OtherClaimTypes 1 71 53 1 124 1 57.3
Source: IRB RPD/RAD Data (AT/P A-2014-04109)
* Figures forGender/Age & Sexual Orientation include intersectingclaimtypes, whereas
OtherClaim Type covers onlycases which are not categorized as involving Gender/Age or
Sexual Orientation
Table 13: Outcomes in new system principal applicant claims,
by selected claim types (2013-14)
Finalized Recognition Exetd Nominal
Claim Type* Accepted Rejected linaized Recognition a on
Rate (COO)**
Gender/Age 808 512 1,320 61.2 56.3 4.9
Sexual Orientation 865 385 1,250 69.2 57.2 12.0
Other 4,965 3,290 8,255 60.1 62.7 -2.6
Total 6,610 4,171 10,781 61.3 61.3 N/A
Source: IRB RPD/RAD Data (ATIP A-2014-04109)
* Figures for Gender/Age & Sexual Orientation each include 44 cases with intersectingclaim types,
whereas Other Claim Type covers only cases which are not categorized as involving Gender/Age or
** Expected Recognition Rates calculated based on weighted countryoforigin averages in cases
finalized on merits
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Table 14: Outcomes in DCO countries under new system, by claims referred (2013-14)*
Abandoned Reject'n Abandon/
Country Designat'n Referred Accepted Rejected / Finalized Recogn'n Rate Withdraw
Type Withdrawn Rate (C31) Rate (C31)
Slovak Qua nt.
Republic 510 126 64 27 217 66.3 41.9 12.4
Hungary Quant. 469 110 75 46 231 59.5 52.4 19.9
Croatia Qua nt. 213 18 164 20 202 9.9 91.1 9.9
Mexico Quant. 135 29 69 22 120 29.6 75.8 18.3
USA Quant. 135 0 60 41 101 0.0 100.0 40.6
Czech Quant. 109 11 32 7 50 25.6 78.0 14.0
Republic
Israel Quant. 83 10 20 35 65 33.3 84.6 53.8
Italy Quant. 69 1 44 3 48 2.2 97.9 6.3
Poland Quant. 65 4 38 15 57 9.5 93.0 26.3
Romania Quant. 54 19 11 17 47 63.3 59.6 36.2
Greece Qual. 41 3 31 6 40 8.8 92.5 15.0
Spain Quant. 41 0 26 12 38 0.0 100.0 31.6
Portugal Quant. 31 0 21 14 35 0.0 100.0 40.0
South Korea Quant. 31 6 15 6 27 28.6 77.8 22.2
France Quant. 15 0 10 6 16 0.0 100.0 37.5
Belgium Qual. 12 0 8 4 12 0.0 100.0 33.3
Ireland Qual. 12 0 0 6 6 N/A 100.0 100.0
Netherlands Qual. 9 0 6 2 8 0.0 100.0 25.0
Chile Quant. 7 0 6 0 6 0.0 100.0 0.0
Japan Qual. 6 0 2 2 4 0.0 100.0 50.0
Sweden Qual. 6 0 5 0 5 0.0 100.0 0.0
Germany Quant. 5 0 4 1 5 0.0 100.0 20.0
Austria Qual. 4 0 1 2 3 0.0 100.0 66.7
Malta Qual. 4 0 4 0 4 0.0 100.0 0.0
Norway Qual. 4 0 2 2 4 0.0 100.0 50.0
Lithuania Quant. 3 0 2 1 3 0.0 100.0 33.3
Slovenia Qual. 3 0 3 0 3 0.0 100.0 0.0
Latvia Quant. 2 0 1 1 2 0.0 100.0 50.0
Switzerland Qual. 2 0 2 0 2 0.0 100.0 0.0
Cyprus Qual. 1 0 0 1 1 N/A 100.0 100.0
Estonia Qual. 1 0 1 4 5 0.0 100.0 80.0
Finland Qual. 1 0 0 1 1 N/A 100.0 100.0
NewZealand Qual. 1 0 1 0 1 0.0 100.0 0.0
Andorra Qual. 0 0 0 0 0 N/A N/A N/A
Australia Qual. 0 0 0 0 0 N/A N/A N/A
Denmark Qual. 0 0 0 0 0 N/A N/A N/A
Iceland Qual. 0 0 0 0 0 N/A N/A N/A
Liechtenstein Qual. 0 0 0 0 0 N/A N/A N/A
Luxembourg Qual. 0 0 0 0 0 N/A N/A N/A
Monaco Qual. 0 0 0 0 0 N/A N/A N/A
SanMarino Qual. 0 0 0 0 0 N/A N/A N/A
UK Qua nt. 0 0 0 0 0 N/A N/A N/A
Total(DCO- 0 0 0 0 0 N/A N/A N/A
Total (DCO-Qualitative) 0 0 0 0 0 N/A N/A N/A
TOTAL (DCO) 0 0 0 0 0 N/A N/A N/A
TOTAL (All Countries) 22,871 10,030 5,865 1,187 17,082 63.1 41.3 6.9
Source IRBCountry Reports (AT/PA-2013-00193)
* Based on all claims referred from countries that were designated as of3l December2014, irrespective of whether
the countries were designated at the time the particular claims from those countries were referred or finalized.
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Table 15: Outcomes in DCO countries under old system, by claims referred (2003-12)*
Abandoned Reject'n Abandon/
Country Designat'n Referred Accepted Rejected / Finalized Recogn'n Rate Withdraw
Type Withdrawn Rate (C31) Rate (C31)
Mexico Quant. 40,804 6,653 24,917 10,590 42,160 21.1 84.2 25.1
Hungary Quant. 11,757 1,022 5,093 4,736 10,851 16.7 90.6 43.6
USA Qua nt. 4,424 56 3,061 1,142 4,259 1.8 98.7 26.8
Israel Quant. 3,430 657 2,356 852 3,865 21.8 83.0 22.0
Czech Republic Qua nt. 3,315 281 1,126 1,805 3,212 20.0 91.3 56.2
South Korea Quant. 1,742 265 1,248 518 2,031 17.5 87.0 25.5
Portugal Quant. 1,101 10 1,318 236 1,564 0.8 99.4 15.1
Romania Qua nt. 1,465 479 521 363 1,363 47.9 64.9 26.6
Poland Quant. 1,260 242 722 346 1,310 25.1 81.5 26.4
SlovakRepublic Quant. 1,525 35 319 702 1,056 9.9 96.7 66.5
Chile Quant. 514 89 434 150 673 17.0 86.8 22.3
Croatia Quant. 1,691 79 326 130 535 19.5 85.2 24.3
Lithuania Quant. 247 85 107 95 287 44.3 70.4 33.1
Germany Quant. 248 12 143 103 258 7.7 95.3 39.9
Latvia Qua nt. 297 81 102 71 254 44.3 68.1 28.0
France Qua nt. 244 7 140 96 243 4.8 97.1 39.5
Spain Quant. 234 8 98 59 165 7.5 95.2 35.8
UK Qua nt. 138 5 98 58 161 4.9 96.9 36.0
Italy Quant. 188 0 97 53 150 0.0 100.0 35.3
Netherlands Qual. 151 11 86 38 135 11.3 91.9 28.1
Greece Qual. 202 13 73 26 112 15.1 88.4 23.2
Estonia Qual. 57 24 31 18 73 43.6 67.1 24.7
Japan Qual. 90 3 45 23 71 6.3 95.8 32.4
Sweden Qual. 74 2 50 17 69 3.8 97.1 24.6
Belgium Qual. 63 7 16 21 44 30.4 84.1 47.7
Slovenia Qual. 41 12 17 14 43 41.4 72.1 32.6
Australia Qual. 44 0 28 13 41 0.0 100.0 31.7
Denmark Qual. 26 5 19 8 32 20.8 84.4 25.0
Ireland Qual. 34 4 16 6 26 20.0 84.6 23.1
Norway Qual. 30 0 12 14 26 0.0 100.0 53.8
Austria Qual. 17 0 9 9 18 0.0 100.0 50.0
Switzerland Qual. 16 1 6 6 13 14.3 92.3 46.2
NewZealand Qual. 10 0 3 10 13 0.0 100.0 76.9
Cyprus Qual. 11 1 8 2 11 11.1 90.9 18.2
Finland Qual. 10 0 5 2 7 0.0 100.0 28.6
SanMarino Qual. 3 1 0 3 4 100.0 75.0 75.0
Malta Qual. 2 0 3 1 4 0.0 100.0 25.0
Iceland Qual. 2 0 2 0 2 0.0 100.0 0.0
Luxembourg Qual. 2 0 0 1 1 N/A 100.0 100.0
Andorra Qual. 0 0 0 0 0 N/A N/A N/A
Liechtenstein Qual. 0 0 0 0 0 N/A N/A N/A
Monaco Qual. 0 0 0 0 0 N/A N/A N/A
Total (DCO - Quantitative) 0 0 0 0 0 N/A N/A N/A
Total (DCO -Qualitative) 0 0 0 0 0 N/A N/A N/A
TOTAL(DCO) 0 0 0 0 0 N/A N/A N/A
TOTAL (All Countries) 265,728 115,175 123,352 46,135 284,667 48.3 59.5 16.2
Source: IRB CountryReports (AT/PA-2013-OO193)
* Based on all claims referred from countries that were designated as of3l December2014, irrespective of whether
thecountries weredesignated at the time the particular claimsfrom thosecountries werereferred orfinalized.
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Table 16: NCB declarations in principal applicant cases finalized on merits under old system,
by RPD Member (2003-12)
Proportion of
RPDMember* Finalized Accepted Rejected* NCB Recognition NCBRate Refusedwith(Merits) Declaration Rate (Merits) NCB
Declaration
MCSWEENEY, DANIEL 560 72 488 178 12.9 31.8 36.5
LEVESQUE, SYLVIE 596 85 511 166 14.3 27.9 32.5
FOURNIER, LLOYD 365 109 256 137 29.9 37.5 53.5
RANDHAWA, SAJJAD 201 12 189 107 6.0 53.2 56.6
MCBEAN, DAVID 281 2 279 105 0.7 37.4 37.6
FISET, EVELINE 636 133 503 104 20.9 16.4 20.7
BADOWSKI, JOHN 439 117 322 103 26.7 23.5 32.0
BYCZAK, MICHEL A. 690 98 592 89 14.2 12.9 15.0
HOMSI, ELKE 458 169 289 88 36.9 19.2 30.4
LAMONT, DEBORAH 251 88 163 80 35.1 31.9 49.1
Subtotal 4,477 885 3,592 1,157 19.8 25.8 32.2
Other RPD Members 130,242 67,182 63,060 2,512 51.6 1.9 4.0
All RPD Members 134,719 68,067 66,652 3,669 50.5 2.7 5.5
Source IRB RPD/RAD Data (AT/PA-2013-01523)
*Ten RPD Members making the largest number ofNCB declarations
Includes cases rejected with NCB declaration
Table 17: NCB declarations in principal applicant cases finalized on merits under new system,
by RPD Member (2013-14)
Proportion of
Finalized NCB Recognition NCBRate Rejectedwith
(Merits) Declaration Rate (Merits) NCB
Declaration
CASSANO, NATALKA 87 39 48 40 44.8 46.0 83.3
BOOTHROYD, KEVIN 180 92 88 33 51.1 18.3 37.5
CUKAVAC, HILDA 133 82 51 28 61.7 21.1 54.9
BOURDEAU, RICHARD 111 81 30 11 73.0 9.9 36.7
TIWARI, RABIN 194 167 27 9 86.1 4.6 33.3
MEKHAEL, RANDA 157 96 61 8 61.1 5.1 13.1
COTE, MAUDE 97 52 45 8 53.6 8.2 17.8
VOLPENTESTA, BERTO 41 18 23 8 43.9 19.5 34.8
BOUSFIELDJOEL 162 127 35 7 78.4 4.3 20.0
POPATlA, BERZOOR 152 91 61 7 59.9 4.6 11.5
Subtotal 1,314 845 469 159 64.3 12.1 33.9
Other RPD Members 9,467 5,765 3,702 123 60.9 1.3 3.3
All RPD Members 10,781 6,610 4,171 282 61.3 2.6 6.8
Source: IRB RPD/RADData (AT/PA2014 04109)
Ten RPD Members making thelorgest number of NCB declarations
Includes cases rejected with NCB declaration
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Table 18: NCB declarations in principal applicant cases from Mexico finalized on merits under old system,
by RPD Member (2009)
Proportion of
RPD Member* Finalized Accepted Rejected** NCB Recogn'n NCBRate Rejected(Merits) Declarat'n Rate (Merits) with NCB
Declaration
BYCZAK, MICHELA. 121 10 111 30 8.3 24.8 27.0
LAMOUREUX, ANDRE 23 0 23 15 0.0 65.2 65.2
LEVESQUESYLVIE 32 5 27 11 15.6 34.4 40.7
MCBEAN, DAVID 33 0 33 8 0.0 24.2 24.2
BADOWSKI,JOHN 40 1 39 6 2.5 15.0 15.4
Subtotal 249 16 233 70 6.4 28.1 30.0
Other RPD Members 1,674 194 1,480 28 11.6 1.7 1.9
All RPD Members(Mexico) 1,923 210 1,713 98 10.9 5.1 5.7
Source: IRB RPD/RAD Data (AT/PA 2014-04109)
Five RPD Members making the largest number of NCB declarations in cases from Mexico in 2009
" Includes cases rejected with NCB declaration
